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ABSTRACT 
 "Realism" is one of the enduring theoretical problems of the cinema. This study aims to 
broaden the parameters of the term by focusing on an often overlooked strain of thought that 
flows throughout the work of a number of prominent and seemingly incongruous thinkers such 
as Bazin, Kracauer, Benjamin, Barthes, Buñuel, and others. Realism, I contend, is undergirded 
by something far more elusive and irrational than verisimilitude or social commentary. To 
demonstrate, I will examine a body of contemporary American films that I will cast—perhaps 
provocatively—as realist. I rely heavily upon Deleuze to discuss how free indirect discourse and 
the disjunction of sound and image open realism to an oneiric and/or intersubjective realm.  
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 1 
CHAPTER 1 
RE-READING REALISM 
“The word ‘realism’ as it is commonly used does not have an absolute and clear meaning, so 
much as it indicates a certain tendency toward the faithful rendering of reality on film. Given the 
fact that this movement toward the real can take a thousand different routes, the apologia for 
‘realism’ per se, strictly speaking, means nothing at all.”1 —André Bazin 
 
By most accounts, 1968 serves as the point of demarcation between the classical period 
of film theory and its subsequent contemporary or political period.2 In its early stage, film theory 
had concerned itself with questions of ontology, authorship, formal qualities, and the like. 
During the heightened political climate of the late 1960’s, the increased emphasis on the 
legitimization of film studies as a discipline and the twin influences of post-structuralism and the 
re-invigorated Marxism of Althusser marked a sea change in how scholars approached the 
medium. The growing sentiment was that cinema, being both popular and one of the most 
pervasive forms of “mass” culture, was one of the conduits of oppressive ideologies. The 
discipline’s concern, many argued, should be less with the aesthetic qualities or the techniques of 
auteurs than the uncovering of the ideological currents that flow—often unbeknownst to the 
spectator—below the surface of the filmic experience.  
 Cinema, and particularly that of the American, capitalist, Hollywood mode, was designed 
to entertain, enchant, and ultimately, in the eyes of the scholarly tradition that emerged in this 
new political climate, deceive. In this view, popular films were myth-making spectacles in which 
the unintended consequence of buying a ticket was the trading of one’s own agency for passivity. 
In short, the cinema is one of the many channels (or apparatuses) by which certain ideologies—
                                            
1 Andre Bazin, Jean Renoir, trans. W. W. Halsey II and William H. Simon,  (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1973), 
85. 
2 For perhaps the most cited elaboration on the shifting terrain of academic film studies, see David Bordwell, 
“Contemporary Film Studies and the Vicissitudes of Grand Theory,” in Post-Theory: Reconstructing Film Studies, 
ed. David Bordwell and Noel Carroll (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1996), 3-36. 
2 
 
racism, patriarchy, neoliberalism—perpetuate themselves, become hegemonic “common sense.” 
And we are all unwitting accomplices.  
 This shift from one era to the next is perhaps best illustrated in the firestorm surrounding 
the publication of Laura Mulvey’s “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema,” which today stands 
as the most famous, most cited, and most debated essay in the history of the discipline.3 Mulvey, 
seeing the camera’s angle on the action as constitutive of a male, heterosexual, patriarchal, 
voyeuristic gaze, argues that the way to break the ideological stranglehold of the classical 
Hollywood form—which was at the time and continues to be prevalent worldwide—is through 
the creation of a counter-cinema that is purposefully un-pleasurable. Consequently, to valorize in 
the commercial cinema—as classical film theory often did—that which is beautiful, intriguing, 
or otherwise enjoyable in the cinema was tantamount to praising the methods of one’s own 
subjugation.4 
 Amid this about-face in approach to the object of study, some of the questions that had 
animated early film debate were abandoned as old-hat. One such disregarded question that I wish 
to explore in this project is that of the possibility and purpose of filmic realism. In classical film 
theory, the relation between the cinema and the real world was often binarized into two camps: 
the realists, their inclination towards films that represent the world as it is; and the formalists, 
those who embraced the artist’s ability to manipulate that which appeared on screen. The two 
tendencies each held in esteem various “patron saints”: in terms of filmmaking, the ur-
documentarist Lumière and the fantastical Méliès; in the theoretical domain, the realist Bazin and 
the formalist Arnheim.5 Yet, in the wake of post-1968 theory, such distinctions were 
                                            
3 Laura Mulvey, “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema,” Screen 16:3, Autumn (1975): 6-18. 
4 Mulvey’s target is the popular, bourgeois cinema. Her attack does not extend to, say, the American avant-garde.  
5 On the various camps of classical film theory, see Robert Ray, How a Film Theory Got Lost and Other Mysteries 
in Cultural Studies (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2001), 3.  
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unnecessary, for the paramount concern moved away from how the film proper worked and 
towards how the film worked to position the subject. The very apparatus of the cinema, it was 
said, is bound up with illusion and ideological manipulation. That is to say, for example, that the 
motion we see on the screen is not actually movement at all but rather the illusion of movement, 
as the film strip is nothing more than a series of discreet photographs; the screen is not a window 
looking onto the world but a flat, two-dimensional plane, not unlike a painter’s canvas; a movie’s 
editing, suggestive of a change of viewing angle amid a consistent time and space, is constituted 
by scenes shot out-of-sequence and assembled piecemeal—minutes, hours, or days later and in 
perhaps diverse spaces. No matter narrative or documentary, long-take or montage, according to 
apparatus theory proponents, the film, once thought for a potential site of Truth, is lying. 
Realism, the story goes, is always constructed, artistically and ideologically, and thus there can 
be no hope for some privileged access to “the real.” 
 It came to be that the realist theory of Bazin was rejected in part or in toto, his theories 
frequently regarded as naïve or blind to ideology, his writing valued for its critical enthusiasm 
more so than any theoretical validity. But there remains much in the oeuvre of Bazin that has 
managed to be overlooked, disregarded, simply missed, most notably an overarching theory of 
realism far more supple than has often been suggested. For instance, in his “Aesthetic of Reality” 
article, Bazin plainly states that “realism can be achieved in one way–through artifice.”6 And so 
much for the line of thinking that Bazinian realism somehow sidesteps artistic machinations, for 
“every realism in art was first profoundly aesthetic.”7 Here, it would seem, Bazin is anything but 
                                                                                                                                             
 
6 Hugh Gray, trans., What is Cinema?, vol. 2 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971, 2005): 26. 
7 Ibid., 25. 
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naïve. In fact, he explicitly acknowledges the constructedness of cinema. If “the book” has been 
written on Bazin, then perhaps it “is in need of some serious reconsideration.”8  
 Bazin thus serves as an ideal starting point for my purposes, for he has been both 
canonized and, until recently, widely rejected. Nevertheless, there remain many nuances in his 
conception of realism that have only now begun to be discovered and discussed, such as the 
resonances with surrealist thought and practice, his proposal that there are multiple and ever-
evolving forms of realism, and that character interiority cannot necessarily be bracketed off from 
a realist approach. Each of these misunderstood arenas will prove beneficial in my reading of a 
selection of contemporary American films that has adopted and modified a type of “aesthetic of 
reality.” That is to say, these all exhibit certain characteristics of the neorealist prototype while 
attempting to work through the inherited limitations of such an aesthetic. Several of my 
examples are frequently framed within the tradition of realism, though others I will perhaps 
provocatively incorporate. I will first highlight these nuances before putting Bazin into alignment 
with other prominent scholars from various periods in history to demonstrate that the stakes of 
realism were always grander and greater than a simple “objective” record of a time and a place 
or the highlighting of the material conditions of poverty.  
BAZIN: UR-REALIST, SURREALIST 
 If Bazin maintains such a prominent place within the history of film studies, why, then, is 
the depiction of him so porous, so filled with omissions that contradict that larger consensus on 
                                            
8 Christian Keathley, Cinephilia and History, or The Wind in the Trees (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 
2006): 63. Just such a reconsideration has recently gained momentum. Angelo Restivo’s The Cinema of Economic 
Miracles (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002) casts the post-neorealist films of Antonioni and Pasolini as a 
“reinvention” of neorealism, one that conforms to some of the more misunderstood aspects of Bazin’s work. Daniel 
Morgan has likewise begun to reevaluate Bazin’s notions in “Rethinking Bazin: Ontology and Realist Aesthetics”, 
Critical Inquiry 32:3, Spring 2006, 443-481. Noted Bazin biographer Andrew Dudley is also intervening on behalf 
of Bazin in light of the proliferation of the digital in his book What Cinema Is! (New York: Blackwell Publishing, 
2010), which will factor into my argument later. 
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the writer and his ideas? Dudley Andrew has suggested that the nature of Bazin’s writing—he 
was a contributor to a number of periodicals and journals as opposed to, say, writing a single 
tome on his theories—resulted in a body of work that today is rarely read sequentially or within 
the context of the adjacent days’ or weeks’ writings, as did his original Parisian audiences.9 
Consequently, his work, if read in sequence, displays the characteristic of ideas being revised 
and worked out over time. Thus, when read piecemeal or anthologized, there may appear to be 
inconsistencies or contradictions—factors, I contend, for the current misreading of Bazin. 
Further, Bazin’s influence was quickly eclipsed in his native France by many of the thinkers who 
would become central to the structuralist turn.  
 In the customary understanding of Bazin, two primary ideas emerge in one of his most 
famous essays, “The Ontology of the Photographic Image”: the indexical nature of the 
photographic (and, by extension, the cinematic) image and the automatic rendering of the 
profilmic event by the mechanical processes of the camera. The image, argues Bazin, bears an 
existential link with that which was filmed. For example, though a superbly detailed painting 
(that is, an icon in the sense of Pierce) of one’s aunt might convincingly represent her, it doesn’t 
bear a physiological connection to her in the same way that her lipstick adhering to a cigarette 
butt in an ashtray does. The painting could well have been done from memory or otherwise 
copied from any other representation of her. The lipstick, though, can only come from her having 
been in that space and at that time. Though surely photography, under most circumstances, 
renders a quite convincing icon of the profilmic event, the resulting image’s very existence is 
tied to the existence of the photograph’s subject.10 
                                            
9 See André Bazin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990) and The Major Film Theories: An Introduction 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1976). 
10 André Bazin, What is Cinema? vol. 1, trans. by Hugh Gray (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967, 
2005): 9-16. 
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 Secondly, and most importantly, the camera may render what is in front of it with only 
the slightest of interventions from the camera’s operator (turning on, turning off). Writes Bazin, 
“All the arts are based on the presence of man, only photography derives an advantage from his 
absence.”11 Thus, the mechanical reproduction of the camera frees the non-cinematic artist (the 
painter, the sculptor, etc.) from the “problem of realism,” which had been so central to the other 
plastic arts since the invention of Renaissance perspective. A painter operating in a realist mode, 
for instance, must first apprehend an object in the world and then concoct an image that more or 
less corresponds to one’s perception of that object onto the canvas. The benefit of photography is 
that the selection of what portions of reality one wishes to capture becomes the foremost concern 
of the photographer, for the camera mechanically renders the object before its lens. Similarly, the 
painter is no longer burdened with the “keeping of records,” for that impulse has been answered 
by a more appropriate medium with the invention of the camera. Hence, painting is free to 
pursue abstraction and expressionism while photography may take up the mantle of the realist 
impulse, a task for which, according to Bazin, the medium is ideally suited.  
 Therefore, Bazin stakes his claim that photography is essentially a realist medium, one 
that is fully dependent for its image upon that which is in front of the lens.12 An example: a 
photograph of an oak tree is necessarily one of an actual, specific oak. By contrast, the drawing 
of an oak needn’t be of an actual tree; instead, it may be an amalgam of several that the artist has 
seen, or a grotesque oak, even an “ideal” oak. Photography, on the other hand, renders an image 
of the necessarily real object in a specific place and time. This characteristic points to additional 
consequences with regard to Bazin’s focus on automatism that rarely garner as much attention. 
                                            
11 Ibid., 13 
12 Obviously, animation and certain practices of the avant-garde—Brakhage’s Mothlight (1963), for example—
complicate Bazin’s ontology. This problem becomes more pronounced with the advent of digital technologies and 
CGI. 
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By being automatic and instantaneous, the process of photography aligns with many of the 
practices of the surrealists.  
 Christian Keathley quite convincingly argues that Bazin’s realism can be productively 
considered in relation to the surrealists’ penchant for automatic writing, the attempt to “write 
one’s unconscious” without regard to form or narrative.13 By writing in such a way—that is, 
hurriedly, automatically—one bypasses the habits of mind that keep at bay her unconscious. The 
camera’s mechanical automatism opens a similar window, thought Bazin, for the camera may 
capture things in the word that are outside the intent of the operator. Thus, the great benefit of 
shooting outdoors was not that it was inherently more “real” than the contrivance of a 
constructed studio set, but rather that it created the opportunity for contingencies to emerge. The 
Formalist school tends to conceive of the filmmaking enterprise a series of choices, one that 
seeks ever-tighter control of the circumstances before the camera. The realism that Bazin 
espoused was one of loosening the insistence on the “mastery” of the scene. Certainly a 
filmmaker can “bounce” the sunlight off a white card to better illuminate a face, but she cannot 
block the breeze that tosses a leaf into the frame. To shoot in such an “open” manner is to invite 
contingency (i.e., things that could have happened another way). Passersby, chipped paint, 
curious shadows: all details that one likely would not conceive to place into the mise-en-scène in 
a tightly controlled production, but yet may greatly enliven the shot. Furthermore, details such as 
these often lure the attention of the spectator away from the plot, such as when one stops 
attentively watching Ricci and Bruno in Bicycle Thieves (De Sica, 1948) and instead notices the 
hanging rugs, now soaked, in the rainy piazza. This is one of the profound ways in which the 
cinema differs from, say, the novel or the painting: in the latter arts, every detail is intentionally 
                                            
13 Keathley, Cinephilia and History, 54-81. 
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placed there by the writer, every stroke calculated. The camera, by nature of its automatism, 
allows for the intrusion of unintended minutiae and moments.  
 Keathley argues that these moments are the very stuff of cinephilia in its Cahiers du 
Cinema heyday. The cinephile, he contends, maintains a posture towards the screen, a state of 
both concentration and distraction. The connoisseur of the cinema practices a mode of perception 
that Keathley calls “panoramic,” one whereby the spectator scans the frame for the marginal, 
affective detail.14 Just as the camera is “open” to capturing these moments, so too is a certain 
type of spectator to noticing them. But why do these marginal objects so intrigue us? 
 Barthes suggests that the contingencies in a photograph are what often most greatly affect 
us. The “punctum” is that detail outside the narrative or intent of the image (the “studium”) that 
stirs us, that “pricks” us.15 Thus, the most engaging elements of the photograph are quite often 
those that are there “by accident.” This is key, for what it suggests is that the photographer, no 
matter how skilled, could not have created the contingency. This higher order of affect is the 
product of something beyond our control, perhaps even our comprehension. Barthes describes it 
as being “outside” meaning, suspended from the customary signifier-signified relationship. The 
punctum is alluring because it is, in some sense, ghostly. It is, so to speak, the bottling of 
lightening by chance. 
 The belief in the camera‘s automatism to pull the affective, contingent elements from the 
world unites not only the surrealists and Bazin, but Jean Epstein’s concept of photogénie as well. 
The photogenic is that which, like Barthes’ punctum, does not signify and cannot be “put there” 
by the filmmaker. Rather, it is something latent within its subject that can only make itself 
manifest with the aid of the camera—perhaps je ne sais quoi, in its most generic and clichéd 
                                            
14 See chapter 2 of Cinephilia and History.  
15 Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography, trans. by Richard Howe (New York: Hill and 
Wang, 1982): 26. 
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form. The machine then registers the affective, ghostly, ephemeral, fleeting characteristic and, 
though later projection, amplifies it. The ordinary world may thus be transformed by the 
camera’s photochemical processes, serving to upset the spectator’s customary ways of seeing, to 
defamiliarize his everyday experience of the world.16   
 Just as automatic writing was thought to provide glimpses of the unconscious, the camera 
was believed to posses the potential to allow the instances of a-signification, bits of the world 
that don’t contribute to the narrative, to arise. This is, of course, why Bazin so admired 
neorealism, for the post-war Italian films tended toward—though by no means as 
programmatically as is often described—an aesthetic of deep-focus cinematography and long 
takes, approaches that were consistent with the cinema’s ontological predispositions. But shots in 
depth and takes in duration were not ends in and of themselves; rather, they operated in concert 
with very particular narrative techniques that more precisely constitute the radical departure from 
classicism that was neorealism—namely, ellipsis and episodic structure. 
 Bazin, by way of analogy, describes the classical film structure as a bridge over a stream 
that is constituted by bricks that are designed to be units within larger constructions. These 
bricks—shall we say “scenes” or perhaps even “shots?”—are then placed together in a 
continuous fashion so as to create a unified path. Rossellini’s films, remarked Bazin, are 
structured around a different sort of unit—the stone. The rocks that jut above the surface of the 
water are not intended to be a pathway, though they certainly may be utilized in such a way. 
Bazin writes: 
[T]he big rocks that lie scattered in a ford are now and ever will be no more than mere 
rocks. Their reality as rocks is not affected when, leaping from one to another, I use them 
to cross the river. If the service which they have rendered is the same as that of the 
                                            
16 See Jean Epstein, “For a New Avant-Garde,” in The Avant-Garde Film: A Reader of Theory and Criticism, ed. P. 
Adams Sitney (New York: New York University Press, 1978): 24-30. 
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bridge, it is because I have brought my share of ingenuity to bear on their chance 
arrangement. 
 
He continues: 
In the same way, the neorealist film has a meaning, but it is a posteriori, to the extent that 
it permits our awareness to move from one fact to the next, whereas in the classical 
artistic composition the meaning is established a priori: the house is already there in the 
brick.17 
 
The classical and neorealist structures may begin on the same bank and end on the opposite, but 
what is most crucial about neorealism is that it requires an effort on the part of the spectator to 
“link up” the “facts” of the narrative. In the jump from one stone (event, moment) to the next, we 
may miss some information, but we are forced to contemplate our “footing” on these “facts.”   
For Bazin, the narrative was not the preeminent feature of the film, for it could (and 
should) contain gaps, tangents, deviations from the typical course that is dictated by cause and 
effect. This de-privileging of narrative in favor of a more ambiguous yet personal, exploratory 
experience of film again returns us to surrealism, specifically to the spectatorial practice of 
André Breton, who would enter movie theaters mid-film and watch only until the narrative began 
to take shape. Once Breton’s viewing of the film was burdened by the intrusion of the plot, he 
would move on to a different theater for another already in-progress film.18 For Bazin, Italian 
neorealism, it may be said, activates a particular type of spectatorship not unlike Breton’s, one 
that demands a level of engagement far different from that which is required of the more 
classical text. And Bazin, a “practicing Surrealist” as late as 1942, no doubt gleaned some of his 
preferences for episodic and elliptical narratives from practices such as Breton’s that “deform” 
                                            
17 Bazin, What is Cinema?, 2:99. 
18 Adam Lowenstein, “The Surrealism of the Photographic Image: Bazin, Barthes, and the Digital Sweet Hereafter,” 
Cinema Journal 46 (2007): 62. 
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the traditionally-structured film by bracketing the episodes and establishing the gaps on one’s 
own through spectatorship.19 
 It should now be clear that Bazin’s concept of realism cannot be reduced to one defining 
feature. “For Bazin,” writes Adam Lowenstein, “the photograph captures, and allows us to 
glimpse, a reality that eludes both perception and imagination by uniting mechanical objectivity 
[…] with affective subjectivity.”20 Here, Lowenstein unites the apparatus with the viewer, 
though he ignores a potential third term—the filmmaker(s). I submit that Bazin’s realism links 
three distinct realms of the cinema: camera, director, spectator.21 Put another way, the 
mechanical ontology of the cinematographic image allows for the affective elements of the real 
to intrude upon the text. This intrusion is aided by a filmmaker’s loosened narrative structure, 
which activates and then rewards an active, probing spectatorship.  
To isolate Bazin’s conception of realism to one of its three facets leads, I contend, to a 
dead end. For instance, formalist scholars such as Christopher Wagstaff and Kristin Thompson 
have been quick to poke holes in the realism of the “Italian Spring,” pointing out the conventions 
and methods that prop up the reality effect of these post-war films.22 Yet, as we’ve already seen, 
Bazin was quite clear in his acknowledgement of the aesthetic nature of the cinematic endeavor, 
even despite the automatic processes of the camera. In a similar fashion, to focus on Bazin’s 
ontology argument to the exclusion of the aesthetic is to again arrive at the notion of a 
transparent, “perfect” realism. But a perfectly “real” cinema ceases to be cinema at all, as Bazin 
                                            
19 Dudley Andrew, What Cinema Is!, 14. 
20Ibid., 56. 
21 Dudley’s What Cinema Is!, published after this thesis was drafted, divides its chapters according to a similar 
tripartite structure of recording, composing, and screening.  
22 See Christopher Wagstaff, Italian Neorealism: An Aesthetic Approach (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
2007) and Kristin Thompson, “Realism in the Cinema: Bicycle Thieves” in Breaking the Glass Armor: Neoformalist 
Film Analysis (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988): 197-217. 
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plainly stated.23 Bazin, borrowing his terminology from geometry, thought of the cinema as 
being an asymptote, a line that tangentially approaches a curve (in this case, the “real”) but never 
touches it. In fact, the closer we get to “the real,” the stranger it becomes. 
In considering Bazin’s essay on Nights in Cabiria (1957), Angelo Restivo argues that 
Fellini, attempting to arrive at the always out-of-reach real, “overshoots” his destination, landing, 
as it were, on the “other side of things.”24 And this other side is, indeed, a strange one, for Bazin 
acknowledges his own failure to adequately describe it, instead relying on the inexact and 
mystical designation of the “supernatural,” a word which “the reader may replace […] with 
whatever he will—‘poetry’ or ‘surrealism’ or ‘magic’—whatever the term that expresses the 
hidden accord which things maintain with an invisible counterpart of which they are, so to speak, 
merely the adumbration.”25 How can the current depiction of a “naïve” Bazin hold in light of a 
pronouncement such as this, one that suggests the emergence of a supernatural neorealism? 
 So we’ve seen that Bazin’s realist theories are indebted in some degree to surrealism. 
But what if this were not, in fact, a “one-way street?” The conventional view of both the realists 
and the surrealists might suggest that the former is concerned with the depiction of surface 
realities while the latter is more interested in the interior or the unconscious. It is easy to 
conceive of these clusters as standing on either side of the figurative line in the sand, and, to be 
fair, many members of the two camps would likely attest to the mutually exclusive nature of 
their endeavors.  
Take, for instance, Luis Buñuel, perhaps the most well-known of the surrealist 
filmmakers. Writing in 1953, Buñuel is particularly dismissive of Italian neorealism:  
                                            
23 See Bazin, “The Myth of Total Cinema,” in What is Cinema?, 1:17-22. 
24 Restivo, Cinema of Economic Miracles, 38. 
25 Bazin, What is Cinema?, 2:88. 
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Among modern tendencies of cinema, the best known is what is called “neo-realism.” Its 
films present to the eyes of the spectator slices of real life, with people taken from the 
street, and with real buildings and exteriors. With a few exceptions, among which I 
especially instance Bicycle Thieves, neo-realism has done nothing to produce in its films 
what is proper to the cinema, that is to say, the mysterious and fantastic. . . . The reality 
of neo-realism is incomplete, official and above all rational; but poetry, mystery, all that 
completes and enlarges tangible reality, is completely lacking in its working.26 
 
And yet, on the very same page, Buñuel praises De Sica’s Umberto D (1952) and, ironically, he 
singles out precisely the same scene that Bazin argues epitomizes the triumph of neorealism, a 
scene that Bazin described as offering “ a glimpse … of what a truly realist cinema of time could 
be.”27 Writes Buñuel: 
In Umberto D, one of the most interesting products of neo-realism, an entire reel of ten 
minutes shows a little maid performing actions which, a little while before, would have 
appeared unworthy of the screen. We see the servant enter the kitchen, light the stove, put 
a pan on the gas, throw water on a line of ants who advance on the wall in indian [sic] 
file, give the thermometer to the old man who feels feverish and so on. Despite the trivial 
nature of the situation, these activities are followed with interest and there is even a 
certain “suspense.”28  
 
Here we have something of an unacknowledged overlap in admiration between the preeminent 
realist and the preeminent surrealist. It is worth emphasizing that this scene, an exception to the 
rule for Buñuel, is an indicator of what realism “could be”—a nod toward the future—for Bazin. 
And note the consistency in both language and tone between Bazin and Buñuel: “poetry,” 
“mystery,” “supernatural,” “magic.”  
 Bazin is not the only realist to be engaged in something of a surrealist project. Ian Aitken 
has cast Siegfried Kracauer, perhaps the only other advocate of realism to share Bazin’s stature, 
as likewise invested in cinema that mines the tensions of the realism-surrealism dialectic.29 
                                            
26 “Cinema, Instrument of Poetry” in The Shadow and Its Shadow, Paul Hammond, ed. (San Francisco: City Lights 
Publishers, 2001): 68. 
27 “De Sica: Metteur En Scène,” in What is Cinema?, 2:76. 
28 “Cinema, Instrument of Poetry”, 68. Cf. Bazin’s essay on De Sica in which he describes in remarkably similar 
language the scene of the maid. What is Cinema?, 2:76-77. 
29 Ian Aitken, “Distraction and Redemption: Kracauer, Surrealism, and Phenomenology,” Screen 39 (1998): 124-
140. 
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Kracauer valued a cinema—necessarily realist, to his thinking—that was equivocal, containing 
images with “indeterminate symbolism.”30 This indeterminacy grants the viewer the ability to 
make associative leaps, to invest the vague image with personal meanings. This therefore 
“redeems” physical reality by restoring its inherent ambiguity, which has been obscured by 
modernity. And once again, a realist aesthetic is trumpeted not as an end unto itself but instead 
for the freedom it grants the viewer in relation to the image. 
If we conceive of Italian neorealism as less about the customary “checklist” of location 
shooting, non-professional actors, and long takes and instead think of it much as the surrealists 
regarded the cinema in general, we arrive at a point of departure in which neorealism is about 
opening a way of seeing, of allowing a particular relationship between the world, the screen, and 
the spectator to emerge. Such a relationship was central not only to Bazin but also to Kracauer, 
Barthes, Deleuze and others.31 In fact, I will contend that this way of seeing is profoundly tied to 
the central questions and paradoxes of the cinema and emerges out of the problems that have 
confounded and frustrated the discipline of film studies since its infancy.  
 I have begun here, with both Bazin and Italian neorealism, in order to frame what I 
consider to be a series of misconceptions about the ideas of the former and the possibilities and 
inheritance of the latter. This study, however, is not about neorealism proper. Rather, my larger 
concern is a growing body of realist films that have been produced in America within the last 10 
years. By applying the existing paradigms of thinking about realism, we risk two mistakes. First, 
it is far too easy to dismiss these films as postmodern re-appropriations of older styles. Again, 
Bazin sees the search for realism as one that must undergo a continual process of reinvention as 
                                            
30 Siegfried Kracauer, Theory of Film: The Redemption of Physical Reality. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1997), 298. 
31 Barthes, however, was far more enthusiastic about photography than the cinema, as evidenced by the following: 
“Whenever I hear the word cinema, I can’t help thinking hall, rather than film.” Roland Barthes, The Rustle of 
Language, trans. Richard Howard (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989): 346. 
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innovations become stale and clichéd.32 And its reemergence cannot be written off (instantly) as 
a stylistic simulation, for, as Bazin proclaimed, “history does not repeat itself; we have to get 
clear the particular form this aesthetic quarrel assumes today.”33 This study aims to enter directly 
into this quarrel. Secondly, if, as I have argued, traditional conceptions of realism are flawed, 
then we perpetuate an incomplete theory by continuing to focus on the most convenient features 
of realist thinking and aesthetics. As a corrective, I will use Bazin as a springboard to a 
reconsideration of realism, one that will ultimately rely on a perhaps unlikely “bedfellow” for 
Bazin: Gilles Deleuze. This pairing might seem unusual initially; however, it is my contention 
that Deleuze’s theorization of the cinema best explicates and puts to use the intangible, irrational 
qualities of the cinema that have more often been lumped under the heading of “poetry” as 
opposed to “realism.” And, despite their numerous differences, both Bazin and Deleuze 
embraced “outlying” neorealist works such as Voyage to Italy (Rossellini, 1954) and, as 
previously discussed, late Fellini as firmly and unproblematically within the project of 
neorealism. Moreover, Deleuze shows a keen understanding of Bazin, arguing the point I’ve 
been making above in the very first sentences of the second and final volume of his foray into the 
cinema:  
Against those who defined Italian neo-realism by its social content, Bazin put forward the 
fundamental requirement of formal aesthetic criteria. According to him, it was a matter of 
a new form of reality, said to be dispersive, elliptical, errant or wavering, working in 
blocs, with deliberately weak connections and floating events. That real was no longer 
represented but “aimed at.”34 
 
 In order to proceed, I will turn my attention to a film that is every bit as dispersive and 
elliptical as the neorealism Deleuze describes, though my example is a contemporary one. In so 
                                            
32 See Restivo’s chapter “The Object Antonioni” in The Cinema of Economic Miracles (95-123). 
33 Bazin, What is Cinema?, 2:16. 
34 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, trans by Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1989), 1. 
. 
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doing, I aim to show how in many ways Bazin’s problem of realism is thought through and 
answered by Deleuze’s cinema project. 
“WHAT DO YOU SEE?”  
David Gordon Green’s 2000 feature debut George Washington proves a fruitful 
beginning point. Set and shot on-location in the rural American South, the film features a cast of 
non-professional actors who improvise large portions of their dialogue throughout the film’s 
largely episodic structure. George Washington, much like notable neorealist pictures Germany 
Year Zero (Rossellini, 1948) and Bicycle Thieves, features children in roles of central 
importance. In short, it carries many of the hallmarks we’ve come to associate with Italian 
neorealism, and, as a result, the postwar Italian cinema is the model that is most often evoked in 
relation to it.35  
 To aid my analysis, I will be relying upon not just Bazin but Deleuze as well. Deleuze 
demonstrates early on in The Time-Image a profound understanding of Bazin’s writings, noting 
how Bazin “showed that neo-realism did not limit itself to the content of its earliest examples.”36 
Deleuze’s taxonomy of the cinema largely follows Bazin’s periodization and the two often 
privilege the same films.37 Most importantly, though, is the central position of neorealism to both 
of their endeavors. Bazin’s legacy, for example, is inextricably linked to the post-war Italian 
cinema. Likewise, this same body of films bifurcates Deleuze’s two books and marks the shift 
from the classical movement-image to the modern time-image. More crucial to my purposes is 
the way in which Deleuze’s conception of the time-image provides both a vocabulary and 
                                            
35 This is especially true in the realm of popular criticism. See A.O. Scott, “Neo-Neo Realism,” New York Times, 
March 22, 2009. 
36 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2, 1. 
37 It merits mention that Deleuze’s Cinema books are largely uninterested in the historical circumstances of 
cinematic production. Thus, the discussion of neorealism isn’t simply the break between the two books, but it is also 
a significant shift in Deleuze’s method, again underscoring the importance of post-war Italy to his philosophy. 
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methodology to address Bazin’s later writings on the cinema that situate the realist filmic image 
in a liminal space between reality and dream, subjective and objective. In short, Deleuze 
provides an intervention into the problem of realism that, as we’ve seen, Bazin can only 
imprecisely label “supernatural.”  
 And why then George Washington? First, as suggested above, it fits many of the 
customary realist criteria; if one were so inclined, she could easily apply the “naïve” writings of 
Bazin and, by focusing on the film’s depiction of poverty and non-professional players, mount a 
critique from the well-beaten path. Yet there remains something more elusive at play in Green’s 
film. In nearly the same breath that critics praise the movie for its fidelity to reality and its 
evocation of the particularities of the Southern, African-American experience, they likewise 
label it “dreamlike,” “lyrical,” akin to a “sleepwalk.”38 In short, the film is at once realist and 
impressionist, lucid and hallucinatory.  
George Washington is confounding in the moments in which it deviates from the facile 
realist “checklist”—location shooting, non-professional actors, long takes, and the like. George 
Washington is sprinkled throughout with peculiar moments, such as a fedora burning in front of a 
church or a boy delivering a soliloquy while dressed in a dinosaur mask. Yet the largest 
anomaly—the one most frequently avoided by critics—is the film’s odd climax, where a car 
crash is treated like a nuclear meltdown, a film crew (ostensibly Green’s) is seen recording the 
protagonist, and our narrator, heretofore speaking in the past tense, breaks into the present tense 
and a different vocal register as she asks, over the image of the hero, “what do you see?” To 
                                            
38 Peter Travers, Review of George Washington, Rolling Stone, December 10, 2000, 113; Jonathan Rosenbaum, 
Review of George Washington, Chicago Reader, http://www.chicagoreader.com/chicago/george-
washington/Film?oid=1064655; Peter Rainer, “Witch Craft,” New York Magazine, November 6, 2000, 
http://nymag.com/nymetro/movies/reviews/4020/ 
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answer this question is to raise a second one: how do we treat sleepwalks that become 
nightmares?  
The narrator’s question brings to the fore other problems that will become quite 
consequential to the remainder of this study. Specifically, to whom is the question addressed? 
The most obvious answer, as we shall see, is that it is “contained” within the diegesis, that the 
narrator is posing a rhetorical question. But what if it extends to the spectator? The indefinite 
nature of the pronoun you in this instance serves as a fitting metaphor for the problems that will 
become central in the following chapters, for, as will soon become apparent, it opens up our 
investigation into the realm between subjective and objective while simultaneously highlighting 
the power of a voice divorced from the image of its bearer. The interplay between image and 
sound that is introduced here will become central in chapters 2 and 3. 
George Washington follows the lives of a group of mostly African-American youths in a 
small town in North Carolina bound together by their poverty and playful explorations of their 
decaying locale. Green structures the film episodically, though bits of character and conflict 
emerge: Buddy (Curtis Cotton, III), a clownish performer, is distraught at his girlfriend Nasia’s 
(Candace Evanofski) rejection of him in favor of the more mature George (Donald Holden), a 
quiet youth with a head deformity and a preoccupation with historic figures and heroic deeds. 
When careless roughhousing results in the accidental death of Buddy, George, along with the 
older, austere Vernon (Damian Jewan Lee) and elfish Sonya (Rachael Handy), inexplicably 
decide to hide the body and vow silence. Nasia provides the (unreliable) narration, believing that 
Buddy, heartbroken at their break-up, has run away. The film centers in its second half on the 
unusual responses of the alliance, as George attempts to literally become the hero he daydreams 
of being, Sonya intensifies her petty thievery, and Vernon bears the guilt of the group’s actions. 
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The landscape of George Washington is a peculiar one, as the natural and man-made 
elements seem to have fought to a draw in a war of attrition. Falling-apart industrial facilities are 
covered in rust; the railroads, seemingly the only employer in the town, are likewise decrepit; 
trains rarely are seen coming or going, as the grass has grown over portions of the tracks, 
suggesting an economy that once flourished but now ceases to be. Green abstracts this landscape 
even further by frequently placing pieces of furniture in and around these industrial wastelands 
while later depicting trees breaking through the concrete floors of abandoned schoolhouses (see 
figs. 1 and 2). In this world, places of labor become playgrounds or lounges while interior spaces 
form unlikely greenhouses. 
 
Figure 1. The “any-space-whatever”: a deserted yet inhabited space of post-industrial rubble39 
                                            
39 This and all subsequent images from George Washington are digital frame captures by the author. George 
Washington. DVD. Directed by David Gordon Green. 2000; New York: The Criterion Collection, 2000. 
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Figure 2. The contamination of inside and outside space 
This contamination of outside and inside recalls the war-torn spaces of neorealism that 
Deleuze dubbed “any-spaces-whatever: deserted but inhabited, disused warehouses, waste 
ground, cities in the course of demolition and construction.”40 The rubble-filled spaces of post-
war Italian cinema inaugurated a “cinema of the seer” whereby the characters, as a result of the 
trauma of the war, suffer a breakdown of “the sensorimotor schemata,” resulting in their 
transformation from active, effectual characters to by-standing spectators stripped of their 
agency.41 However, it is not war that has disrupted the ability to act in this instance but rather the 
town’s economic deterioration; its cessation of production has ushered in the trauma that has 
created the any-space-whatever, which is traversed by children who, to borrow Deleuze’s 
description of the youth of neorealism, are “affected by a certain motor helplessness, but one 
                                            
40 Deleue, Cinema 2, xi. 
41 Ibid., 2. 
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which makes them all the more capable of seeing and hearing.”42 Deleuze’s description of the 
space of neorealism—note his absence of any discussion of studio or location shooting—helps to 
explain the unsettling features of George Washington’s landscape. Green creates a dreamlike, 
poetic, even hallucinatory realm, one where, to quote Deleuze, “we no longer know what is 
imaginary or real, physical or mental.”43 Thus, Deleuze’s description of an ephemeral 
environment in neorealism clearly holds true in George Washington, which “feels” real, yet 
somehow heightened, at once too vivid and abstract. 
 George Washington is difficult to interpret precisely because it contains instances that 
cannot be said to “signify” in any rational way. For example, there is a brief scene in the film in 
which a fedora sits aflame on the grass outside a church. At no time before or after this scene do 
we ever learn to whom the hat belongs, who set it on fire, or how it got there. In short, the scene 
seems to be there for no good reason other than an expressionistic directorial flourish. Instead, 
we watch an object denied any significance burn in act that is likewise stripped of any symbolic 
meaning. By highlighting an object that fails to “connect” to the larger narrative, Green returns 
us to the notion of contingency that is so central to not only to Bazin but also to Barthes and 
especially to Kracauer. This hat needn’t be in the film, and yet it is. And as it smolders, we 
watch, suspended momentarily from an already loose narrative, free to ponder the hat’s “hat-
ness.” Deleuze, by no stretch of the imagination a “realist,” still discusses objects such as this 
one in terms remarkably similar to how Bazin, Barthes, and Kracauer theorized the contingent 
detail in the mechanical image. In the pre-war movement-image era, posits Deleuze, “objects and 
settings already had a reality of their own, but it was functional reality, strictly determined by the 
                                            
42 Ibid., 3. 
43 Ibid., 7. 
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demands of the situation.”44 On the contrary, in the time-image of the post-war era, “objects and 
settings take on an autonomous, material reality which gives them an importance in 
themselves.”45 What we are left with is a moment of intensity, revealing “a visual and sound 
nakedness, crudeness and brutality which make it unbearable.”46 By denying select objects of the 
film a significatory “purpose,” Green forces the spectator into what Deleuze calls an 
“encounter,” a “limit circumstance”47 in which the spectator establishes a “dreamlike connection 
through the intermediary of the liberated sense organs.”48 This granting of autonomy to the 
object will extend, as we shall see, into the realm of sound and, ultimately, into the space 
between subjective and objective. 
THE FREE INDIRECT AND THE LIMIT SITUATION  
Green’s off-kilter approach to George Washington, which, as noted above, fits nearly 
every item on a checklist of neorealism as traditionally conceived, culminates in its most 
confounding sequence. George, remembering Buddy’s indifference to religion and (presumably) 
concerned that he may have been denied of an afterlife, removes the boy’s body from its well-
hidden place and baptizes the corpse in a river. When the body is later found, Vernon and Sonya, 
fearful of arrest, steal a car and attempt to run away, thus beginning the film’s most startling shift 
in tone.  
 The sequence begins with George in full hero regalia surveying the wreckage of Sonya 
and Vernon’s stolen vehicle, which, according to Nasia’s narration, flipped during their unseen 
escape attempt. Workers in hazmat suits spray fire extinguishers at the still-spinning tires as 
various children attempt to summarize the events that transpired to a television news crew 
                                            
44 Ibid., 4 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid., 3 
47 Ibid., 6 
48 Ibid., 4 
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already on site. George then proceeds to run away from the scene as Green cuts to a shot of 
Nasia stopping to tie her shoe in front of a railroad track, where she sees an injured Vernon and 
Sonya escaping on foot along the tracks. Back to George: he continues to run, this time turning 
to look over his shoulder. He appears frantic, weakened, as he moves towards the outer wall of 
an abandoned factory. From the apparent point-of-view of George, a news reporter and 
cameraperson sprint toward him as if seeking comment. George falls against the wall and 
slouches to the ground as his eyes roll back. From an extreme wide shot, we see a film crew 
(noticeably different than the news crew we just saw, as evidenced by the 35mm camera and 
boom microphone as opposed to the video equipment and reporter’s handheld mic) recording 
(the sleeping, dead, unconscious?) George. Green next cuts to a shot of an unharmed George 
sitting in a chair, lavelier microphone pinned to his shirt, as an unseen interviewer asks what 
George considers the most important attributes of a hero and which of those he possesses to 
qualify.  
 Green provides some clues of sorts earlier in the film that allow me, with the aid of 
Deleuze, to stake an interpretative claim. During a scene in which George and Vernon discuss 
their respective diving abilities with younger boys in the locker room of the community pool, 
Nasia is seen peeking around a corner as if she were spying on the conversation taking place (see 
figs. 3 and 4). Here, Nasia is granted access into a privileged instance and space. It would be 
easily dismissed, however, if it weren’t for a similar scene just prior to the climatic sequence. 
George, apparently alone on a rooftop, throws the helmet that protects his frail head to the 
ground (see fig. 5). Again, Nasia is seen standing behind a wall, watching. (see fig. 6) At no 
point in either of these two instructive scenes is she ever framed within the same shot as the boys 
or as George. She does not participate or interact with the other characters, nor do they appear to 
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be aware of her presence. Likewise, when we see Vernon and Sonya along the tracks, Green 
supplies us no master shot. 
 
Figure 3. George (Donald Holden) in the boys’ locker room 
 
Figure 4. Next shot: Nasia (Candace Evanofski) peers from around the corner. 
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Figure 5. George casts his helmet off the ledge in an apparent private moment. 
 
Figure 6. Nasia, once again viewing privileged instances 
It seems unlikely that Nasia was actually present in either of these moments. What, then, 
might we make of her presence? Following Pasolini, Deleuze theorizes a free indirect style of 
cinematic enunciation, whereby the “distinction between what the character [sees] subjectively 
and what the character [sees] objectively [vanishes], not in favor of one or the other, but because 
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the camera [assumes] a subjective presence, [acquires] an internal vision, which [enters] into a 
relation of simulation with the character’s way of seeing.”49 In the free indirect, we have a 
contamination of voices, a third position between subjective and objective that is not fixed, but 
rather marks the space between the two poles in a constant oscillation. Thus, Nasia, our narrator, 
attempts to tell the story of the summer we see in the film, but, reaching the limit situation, the 
indiscernible moment, switches gears. No longer able to make sense of the events that next took 
place, we enter into her subjective thoughts, but “spoken” as if filtered through the consciousness 
of George. At no other point in the film are we ever provided a shot that connotes George’s 
subjective vision as we do in the shot in which the reporters run towards him, microphone in 
outstretched arms. It is my contention that what we are seeing is Nasia creating a fiction, an 
assumption, of George’s state of mind, engaging in what Deleuze terms a process of 
“fabulation,” of storytelling. Here, the narrator, confronting the limits of her own ability to 
understand the events of that fateful summer, begins to fill in the gaps. Thus, in the climactic 
scene, we shift between multiple positions: George’s subjectivity; Nasia, at once as character 
within the story and again as supplier of the narration; and that of director Green, whose 
enunciative position forms the camera consciousness. Green’s presence complicates the 
proceedings even further, as he “plays” George’s unseen interviewer in the denouement. Hence, 
the director’s voice literally enters into the film. The schizophrenic, hallucinatory nature of the 
ending of George Washington derives precisely from its polyvocality, as Nasia’s memory and 
recounting of events collides with the spectator’s (vis-à-vis Green’s) entry into George’s 
consciousness, all of which is further complicated by the seeming presentness of the depiction 
                                            
49 Ibid., 148. It should be noted that, though he never addressed the topic in explicit terms, Bazin recognized and 
admired cinematic moments of the free indirect. For instance, in discussing Agnès Varda, Bazin writes, “Varda links 
her work to the intimate diary or better still to a kind of first person récit that for discretion’s sake prefers to appear 
in third person.” Quoted in Dudley Andrew, What Cinema Is!, 106.  
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before us. Are we witnessing fantasy, reality, dream, memory? In Deleuze, we find that there is 
no answer, for the real and virtual, the past and the present coexist. To consider this further, 
though, we must clarify two of Deleuze’s key concepts—the crystal and the circuit.  
Within the Cinema books, Deleuze does not distinguish between what is actual (i.e., real, 
tangible) and what virtual (e.g., mental images, dreams); in fact, the distinction is irrelevant to 
Deleuze, for both the actual and the virtual are two sides of the same image. That one is 
grounded in the material world is beside the point, particularly in the time-image, where the 
ability to discern between images is especially enfeebled. Deleuze suggests the fitting analogy of 
a mirror: 
It is as if an image in a mirror […] came to life, assumed independence and passed into 
the actual, even if this meant that the actual image returned into the mirror and resumed 
its place in the postcard or photo, following a double movement of liberation and 
capture.50 
 
These duplicate images oscillate or alternate between one another, an alternation that Deleuze 
calls a “circuit.” In such a circuit  
the real and the imaginary, the physical and the mental, or rather their images, continually 
[follow] each other, running behind each other and referring back to each other around a 
point of indiscernability. But this point of indiscernability is precisely constituted by the 
smallest circle, that is, the coalescence of the actual image and the virtual image, the 
image with two sides, actual and virtual at the same time.51 
 
This smallest circuit forms the Deleuzian “crystal”: the exact point where the real, present 
moment fuses with its virtual double, which springs from the mind of the perceiving subject. In 
short, the virtual can be said to be always, already in the past, for it corresponds to an extent with 
human memory. Hence, with the crystal-image, we begin to experience time as it is: at once 
present and simultaneously past. 
                                            
50 Ibid., 68. 
51 Ibid., 69. 
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Thus, the mixing of voices and of enunciative positions in George Washington serves to 
cloud the distinction between the actual—in this case, what actually occurred within the diegesis 
of the film—and the virtual—that is, what Nasia invents or fabulates; the two cannot be 
distinguished. This circuit is made explicit with George’s actions in the scene in question. As we 
first see George, he runs as if responding to a call for help; upon our return to him, he appears to 
be moving to avoid capture. Thus, in one instance, we see an image of George and in the next, 
we see that image’s mirror opposite. Deleuze, speaking of both Hitchcock generally and more 
specifically of Visconti’s founding neorealist film Ossessione (1943), describes the time-image’s 
ineffectual hero as being “prey to a vision, pursued by it or pursuing it, rather than engaged in an 
action.”52 We can easily see how these words map on to this contemporary example during 
George’s failed heroics (see figs. 7 and 8).  
This oneiric climax, completely ungrounded in any “objective truth” or stable narrative 
point-of-view, would at first seem incompatible with a traditional conception of what realism is; 
yet Deleuze’s understanding demonstrates how such a sequence is fully in line with what he saw 
emerging in the post-war Italian cinema, for fundamental to neorealism are “subjective images, 
memories of childhood, sound and visual dreams or fantasies, where the character does not act 
without seeing himself acting, complicit viewer of the role he himself is playing.”53  
The ending of George Washington is an unsettling one; for the bulk of the film, Nasia’s 
authority as narrator accompanies us as we, to return to Bazin’s analogy, leap from rock to rock, 
from fact to fact. Suddenly, with no warning, we experience a rupture in the narrative and find 
ourselves in a gap, a space in between objective and subjective, between dream and wakefulness,  
real and virtual. And there we are left with her question: “what do you see?” Nasia is incapable  
                                            
52 Deleuze, Cinema 2, 3. For an illuminating discussion of Ossessione’s place within the history of neorealism, see 
Restivo, 24. 
53 Ibid., 6. 
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Figure 7. The actual and virtual as mirror image 
 
Figure 8. George, now retreating from an unseen threat. Deleuze: “he is prey to a vision, pursued 
by it or pursuing it…” 
 
of answering, so at first she turns to her own fiction and then, finally, to us, for the answer. 
George, at the beginning and the ending of the film, is enigmatic, awkward, suffering from 
delusions of grandeur. Nasia is our seer, not George, nor Sonya, nor Vernon, and, as such, Nasia 
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suffers from a paralysis of action. Nasia, like Ingrid Bergman in Europa ’51, “has learnt to 
see.”54 By seeing in this manner (the virtual and the actual, both past and present 
simultaneously), she points us back to Bazin, who saw in neorealism something beyond a goal of 
objectivity and verisimilitude. For Bazin, the camera produces “an image that is a reality of 
nature, namely, an hallucination that is also a fact.”55  
I will argue moving forward that perhaps the greatest potential of the cinema—and why 
such a varied array of thinkers, theorists, and scholars have held out such hope for it—is that it 
holds out the promise of alternate ways of seeing and hearing, ways that might hone the normal 
human faculties that have been dulled by the proliferation of the image in the postmodern. 
Realism, to quote Bazin, rids us of “the piled-up preconceptions” and “the spiritual dust and 
grime” that obscure our experience of the world.56 In short, the great stakes of realism that have 
run like a current underneath the bulk of theories of it, are the encounters with the ineffable, the 
uncanny—the limit situation of our own existence. 
GREEN, UN NOIR 
“[T]he people do not pass over to the side of the camera without the camera having passed over 
to the side of the people.”57—Gilles Deleuze 
 
George Washington brings into play another idea crucial to Deleuze: the “powers of the 
false.”58 In the movement-image, the cinematic “description” is “presented as independent of the 
description which the camera gives of it”; with the emergence of the crystal, we encounter a 
“second pole of consciousness,” which exposes the relationship between the real and the 
                                            
54 Ibid., 2. 
55 Bazin, What is Cinema? 1:16. 
56 Ibid., 15. 
57 Deleuze, Cinema 2, 154. 
58 Ibid., 126-155. Rodowick’s explication in the sixth chapter of Gilles Deleuze’s Time Machine is especially helpful 
in navigating this most tricky of concepts.  
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imaginary.59 Neorealism, for Deleuze, is of paramount importance, not because of its seeming 
objectivity or its purported political project, but because these films “extract from [their 
locations] those pure descriptions which develop a creative and destructive function.”60 This 
function is founded upon an idea that is not only crucial to Deleuze’s purposes but also to Bazin: 
the notion of contingency.61 Deleuze, by channeling Leibniz, describes the coexistence of what 
would seem to be mutually exclusive results emerging from the same historical reality. For 
example, we may predict that the outcome of an upcoming event may be either x or y. If the 
result winds up being x, then it falsifies what was a truth in the past, that y was possible. By 
extension, if y was not a possibility, then x was, in a way, inevitable, and therefore not subject to 
factors that might have made it otherwise. In essence, we have (yet another) paradox, one that 
demonstrates that “when this present becomes past, we must choose between incongruous 
truths.”62 Thus, x and y are “incompossible”: not simply contradictory, but, oddly, equally valid 
and yet invalidated by the other.  
  The notion of imcompossibility proves foundational to what is perhaps Deleuze’s most 
complex and baffling argument in the Cinema books. Here, we have two positions that begin as 
truths that eventually have the potential to falsify the other. Neither, though, is intrinsically false. 
From this peculiar notion, Deleuze introduces the powers of the false, the ability of the cinema 
not simply to speak for colonized peoples but to “call a people into being.” Such a proclamation 
is curious on two levels: first, we tend to think, especially in relation to the postcolonial 
ethnographic cinema that Deleuze examines, that colonized identities are liberated by the truth 
                                            
59 Ibid., 126-7. 
60 Ibid., 126, emphasis mine. 
61 Deleuze, What is Cinema?, 2:68. 
62 D.N. Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze’s Time Machine (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1997), 97. 
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and conversely are caged by falsities. Secondly, how does the filmic medium, mere light 
collected and projected on a screen, create a people?  
 The answer to this riddle once again lies with the free indirect. Let us think of the 
“truth”—demonstrated earlier as being simultaneously true and false—of the colonized as one 
constructed by the colonizer. By dictating both the record of history and the tongue in which that 
history is recounted, the colonizer comes to manufacture the truth. The subjects then may counter 
this truth with another that in turn falsifies the original. This is not, however, a matter of 
correction, of substituting the actual reality for the one created and endorsed by the oppressors. 
Rather, through a process of storytelling, of fabulation, the colonized subvert the reality of the 
colonizers. This process of fabulation, though, is aided by the presence of an intercessor, one 
who provides the means by which the “invented” story circulates—in terms of the Cinema 
books, this intercessor is, obviously, the filmmaker. As describes Deleuze, in order to accomplish 
this complex subversion, the two parties in the creative endeavor must “become” one another: 
the filmmaker, a subject; the subject, a filmmaker. Deleuze, in speaking of Shirley Clarke and 
her Portrait of Jason (1967), writes that “the film she wanted to make about herself became the 
one she made about Jason.”63 Thus, Clarke is as much the subject of the film as is the titular 
performer. As we will see, this sort of becoming finds articulation in George Washington. 
 Deleuze’s aim here is to undo the Cartesian subject, the idea that Ego=Ego , an equation 
that Rodowick describes as being “alien” to Deleuze’s entire philosophical outlook.64 The 
traditional documentary in which an “outsider” explores another culture or group reinforces the 
differing status of the filmmakers and the film’s subjects. In short, it reifies the status of another 
as The Other, as filmmaker and subject of the film remain “separate.” The only solution to this 
                                            
63 Deleuze, Cinema 2, 154. 
64 Rodowick, Deleuze’s Time Machine, 140. 
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conundrum is for the two sides to approach one another in a becoming, a transformation, a 
metamorphosis. By the filmmaker speaking her thoughts through the language of the colonized, 
she becomes something other than herself—the “I is another” formulation that Deleuze takes  
from Rimbaud.65 Similarly, the documentary subject, in constructing not what he was or is but, 
instead, what he might become, is engaged in a process of creation, of storytelling. Thus, both 
the documentary filmmaker and the subject of the documentary collectively craft a fiction. This 
fiction, a story of possibility, has the potential of awakening the sense of possibility in others 
similarly situated. The “objectivity” of the filmmaker is “corrupted” by his or her speaking in the 
manner of the subjects of her film. And by doing so, she assists in the falsification of history as 
dictated by the colonizer and, at once, to perpetuate a fiction, the performance of the colonized as 
film subjects.  
 How does this relate to George Washington? In short, the film is an exemplar of the 
powers of the false. I have already detailed its unusual story of a segment of the population who 
rarely garners such an empathetic, attentive lens: the poor black youth of the American South. 
Perhaps even more surprising is the fact that director David Gordon Green is white. The presence 
of the free indirect does not only create an indiscernibility of past and present or memory and 
dream, but similarly presents just this sort of fabulation, this co-falsifying narrative. Nasia, in the 
privileged position of narrator, speaks for her (and the film’s) hero, George, but in the manner in 
which she would imagine him to speak for himself. Recall the ending of the film, where George 
is first seen running towards the car accident, then away from it, and is last shown being 
                                            
65 Deleuze, Cinema 2, 153. This line comes from Rimbaud’s 1871 letter to Demeny, one that appears immensely 
influential on Deleuze’s work. Note the similarities in phrasing and the conceptual commonalities: “I witness the 
unfolding of my own thought: I watch it, I hear it. … I say one must become a seer, make oneself a seer. The Poet 
makes himself a seer by a long, rational and immense disordering of the senses. … Let him die charging among 
those unutterable, unnameable things.” Arthur Rimbaud, “Exceprt from ‘Lettre à Paul Demeny: Charleville, 15 mai 
1871’”, trans by A.S. Kline, http://www.poetryintranslation.com/PITBR/French/Rimbaud3.htm; Rimbaud’s italics.  
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interviewed by a supposed news reporter about his heroism. Yet, what heroic act did he 
accomplish? We know that he arrived on the scene too late to prevent the crash, and we never 
again see Vernon or Sonya, so we may assume that George had no hand in their rescue or 
apprehension. Thus, into the fact of the car crash, Nasia inserts an imagined intervention by 
George, one that conforms to both her and George’s hope that he would one day become a hero 
on par with his idols. Yet the visual narration contradicts Nasia’s account by showing George 
retreating and collapsing. Both outcomes are mutually exclusive: each story falsifies the other, 
and both are aided by Green, who refuses to provide an answer and declines to clarify “what 
really happened.” 
How, then, does this fabulation invent a people? Postcolonial theory has taught us to 
extend the concept of colonialism and imperialism beyond the boundaries of nations and to apply 
it to marginalized groups, even (and perhaps especially) to those in the West. By framing the 
young characters of George Washington as subaltern subjects, we push free indirect discourse to 
its more politically engaged dimension.  In the epigraph above that opened this section, Deleuze 
describes the process of fabulation as a crossing over of sides, an approach toward the opposite 
partner in the filmic endeavor. Green intentionally avoided making a film about the tribulations 
of his own (white, middle-class) and instead brought an ethnographic perspective to George 
Washington. “In America,” says Green, “I think there’s a certain economic level where race 
really stops being an issue, because everyone’s already got enough going on just trying to put 
food on the table. Plus, I don’t necessarily think 26-year-old white guys are that interesting. So 
why would I want to make another movie about their coffee shops and romantic pitfalls?”66 By 
                                            
66 David Gordon Green, “If I Ever do Anything Clever, Shoot Me,” interview with Danny Leigh, The Guardian, 25 
September 2001. Despite this proclamation, Green’s second feature All the Real Girls (2003) tackles precisely this, 
the love lives of twenty-six-year-olds, though in an episodic, poetic style somewhat reminiscent of George 
Washington.  
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choosing to focus on poor blacks in the post-industrial American South, Green initiates the two-
way process of becoming. 
Green cast his film by visiting churches, youth groups, and playgrounds to find his cast of 
non-professionals. By adopting an episodic narrative structure and allowing the children to 
improvise their lines according to his loose scenario, Green was freed to organize his film around 
only those scenes that “worked,” for few scenes were crucial in terms of plot and were therefore 
expendable.67 It is in this sense that the film clearly displays its neorealist inheritance as well as 
opening up the opportunity for the creation of a people, as it allows Green’s actors to “play” in a 
way that thoroughly aligns with Deleuze’s powers of the false. In order to proceed, we must first 
clarify some terminology. David Rodowick points out that the description of the word fabulation 
as synonymous with “storytelling” in Tomlinson’s and Galeta’s translation of Cinema 2 loses 
some of the specificity of the book’s original French. Deleuze’s original term (récit) is “neither 
precisely a document nor a fiction, but a form of enunciation that gravitates between these two 
poles in a free indirect relation.” Rodowick describes fabulation as being “beyond” either 
narration or description, beyond the mimetic (i.e., showing or simulative) and the diegetic (i.e., 
narrative or telling).68 For example, the camera directly represents that profilmic event and, thus, 
performs a mimetic function. At the same time, the selection and ordering of events via editing 
(and, to an extent, the inclusion and exclusion that is the framing of the shot) conforms to the 
dramatic or diegetic mode.  It is apparent that these two modes function simultaneously in the 
cinema; with Deleuze, though, designating an element of the visual or audio tracks as a function 
of one or the other becomes quite difficult. We have seen in the case of George Washington that 
we cannot attribute the diegesis unproblematically to Nasia’s narratorial logic. Likewise, the 
                                            
67  David Gordon Green Interview—No Budget Strategy [video]. (2009). Retrieved March 3, 2010, from 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4h3tAMIqf3w 
68 Rodowick, Deleuze’s Time Machine, 157. 
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mimetic event is complicated, for we cannot know if what we are seeing and hearing actually 
happened or if it is fantasy. Further, if it is indeed fantasy, to whom can we attribute this 
figment? Hence, fabulation refers not simply to “storytelling,” nor a blending of the mimetic and 
diegetic modes, but a fundamental disturbance between the two.  
This disturbance is the key to George Washington. The disruption of the usual stable 
relationship between subjectivity and objectivity, sound and image creates a becoming, a mutual 
transformation in which real children play fictional ones and, through this process and with the 
help of Green, these fictions become real, lies becomes truths. And in so doing, Green 
relinquishes the position of director who passively or objectively records the “real” before him 
and, instead, becomes one of his subjects. The young children of George Washington do not 
sound a cry that is uniquely that of poor, black kids in the post-industrial South. Rather, they and 
Green create a highly specific collective enunciation that awakens those similarly situated in yet 
another becoming, thereby “calling into existence” those that might not have existed before. For 
this to occur, the children of the film had to step towards the camera to become they who tell 
their story. And David Gordon Green, the director, had to become a young black child, un noir.  
It is in light of this becoming that the film’s title becomes especially significant: George 
Washington, having effectively founded the nation, is the signifier to which one points to unify 
the concept of America—as governmental seat, preeminent “founding father,” literally 
exchanged as currency. But whereas George Washington can be said to have called forth the 
white- and male-dominated nation, George Washington founds the “missing people,” those 
whose existence cannot be subsumed under the nation as signified by the film’s namesake.   
What I’ve hope to demonstrate to this point is that to frame George Washington in the 
terms of an “objective” realist aesthetic is to overlook its most startling achievement—its 
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obliteration of the distinction between filmmaker and subject. Moreover, in placing us briefly 
within the interstice of the ostensible real and the obvious fiction, the film transiently grasps the 
irrationality that subtends the rational, coherent world that the traditional conception of realism 
took as its mission to depict. In so doing, it precisely locates that which I contend is what unites 
the cast of theorists (Bazin, Kracauer, Barthes, Breton, Buñuel, etc) that I put into conversation at 
the beginning of this chapter. That is to say, the cinema lends itself to the middle ground, of 
being between two registers: real and fantasy, subjective and objective, actual and virtual, 
diegetic and mimetic. The specific benefit of Deleuze is that he articulates a framework to 
approach these contradictory characteristics, these seeming paradoxes that have long been a 
conundrum for film theory. It is for this reason that Deleuze will remain central moving forward. 
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CHAPTER 2 
STORYTELLING 
 We looked in the previous chapter at George Washington, for it seems to fit comfortably 
within the customary, rudimentary characteristics of a realist cinema with its location shooting, 
non-professional actors, and its depictions of impoverished youth (though these images are as 
oblique as they are bleak). More interesting to me, though, is how such an easy categorization is 
shot through with contradictions, contradictions that were acknowledged not only Bazin but also 
Barthes, Breton, Epstein, and others as being both exceedingly rare and yet essential to the filmic 
image. In this case, David Gordon Green’s camera is, as Dudley Andrew might describe it, 
“open to the world” in such a way as to bring into view the irrational, the intersubjective, the 
oneiric.69 In other words, that which subtends the real is brought forth, either “found” or “called 
into being.”  
 I want to next turn my attention to another set of examples, this time from the recent 
movement of sorts known as “Mumblecore,” for, like George Washington, it displays a similar 
set of incongruities. These instances certainly fit the common criteria, the checklist of the 
neorealist inheritance. And yet, the “real” in these films tends to evoke another realm altogether. 
This realm, one that Bazin labeled “poetic” and “mysterious,” is situated on the other side of the 
“objective” real; these films, as we shall see, perch us somewhere in between worlds. 
 And though Mumblecore certainly aligns with my concerns from the previous chapter, 
these films also push our discussion into another register as well, for the majority of Mumblecore 
filmmakers shoot digitally. Thus, it raises both aesthetic and theoretical questions about the 
possibilities of realism in the age of ones and zeroes. For instance, how does the digital change 
                                            
69 Dudley Andrew, What Cinema Is!, 98. 
 
39 
 
the parameters of the discussion of realism when the image is no longer photochemically 
derived? Furthermore, what do we make of a realist aesthetic that is simultaneously indebted to 
and critical of digital technology, its manipulability, and its contribution to the proliferation of 
the image in the postmodern? The texts in question in this chapter foreground their characters’ 
complex relationships between themselves and the images they create. That these characters, we 
find, are played by their directors shifts the films at hand from a mere appropriation of older 
realist styles and into a meta-cinematic self-critique of the production of images and how we use 
them. 
 Let us consider generally, before moving into specific examples, Mumblecore as a whole. 
Mumblecore derives its name from its characters’ tendency to mutter their words, a by-product 
of improvisation, scriptlessness, and the natural speech patterns of the non-actors cast in the 
roles.  The Mumblecore group coalesced in 2006 at the South by Southwest Film Festival in 
Austin, Texas, when several films appeared in and out of competition that were marked by a 
similar aesthetic and a preoccupation with the love lives of post-collegiate twenty-somethings. 
Detecting a shared sensibility, these directors became friends and soon began to cast one another 
in their projects, leading Filmmaker magazine to comically create a flowchart of the various and 
multiple associations amongst the frequently intermingled group. 
 Prominent filmmakers within the collective include Joe Swanberg (Hannah Takes the 
Stairs [2007], Nights and Weekends [2008]), Andrew Bujalski (Funny Ha Ha [2002], Mutual 
Appreciation [2005]), The Duplass Brothers (The Puffy Chair [2005], Baghead [2008]) and 
Aaron Katz (Dance Party USA [2006], Quiet City [2007]). Though there are clear differences 
among them—Bujalski’s French New Wave influences and his shooting on 16mm, Swanberg’s 
40 
 
frank sexuality, The Duplass Brothers’ commercial leanings, Katz’ lyrical pillow shots—the 
communicative floundering of the characters remains Mumblecore’s most salient feature.  
This enfeeblement extends itself, though, beyond the realm of talking, as these urban hipsters 
also suffer from emotional over-cautiousness and a paralyzing fear of action. 
The inability to act or engage closely parallels with the passive protagonists Deleuze 
described in The Time-Image, those characters who, following the trauma of war, found 
themselves no longer the active and able protagonists of the classical “movement-image”; rather, 
we have a “new race of characters […], kind of mutant: they saw rather acted, they were seers.”70 
As we’ve seen, this shift in agency that begins with neorealism is, according to Deleuze, 
fundamental to the emergence of the time-image, a new regime of the image in which the 
“sensory-motor linkage”71 has been loosened, making way for “pure optical and sound 
situations.”72 In this new regime, filmic characters passively record the world around them as 
opposed to affecting it in any measurable manner. In short, the protagonists have become 
“sleepwalkers.”73 In the case of Mumblecore, love and relationships make up the most frequent 
dramatic crises of these films, yet they rarely resemble Hollywood romances, where the 
characters’ desires are clearly laid out in the first act and the conflict resolves itself when the 
barriers to their couplings are either eliminated or proven insurmountable. Here, such a trajectory 
seems impossible, for in order to initiate an action, one would have to be able to articulate a 
desire. This proves to be the crisis of Mumblecore, for the desire is there, but the agency, the 
volition, is missing. 
                                            
70 Deleuze, Cinema 2, xi. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid., 2. 
73 Ibid., 3. 
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  These problems—of connection, of representation, of realism—are quite pronounced in 
the work of Joe Swanberg, the most prolific and controversial of the Mumblecore filmmakers. 
Swanberg, unlike Bujalski or Katz, fully embraces a digital aesthetic, one that seems to proudly 
showcase the technical limitations of his “pro-sumer” equipment. For instance, Swanberg utilizes 
the 1.33:1 aspect ratio native to the camera as opposed to masking it to replicate the more 
standard “cinematic” 1.85:1; likewise, he rarely “corrects” fluorescent lighting and pushes his 
camera to the brinks of its contrast range, resulting in a “blown out” image. Despite the 
highlighted low-fi visuals, Swanberg’s first feature, Kissing on the Mouth, draws my attention 
not for its look so much as its sound, which radically deviates from the typical deployment of 
voice-over narration, marks the film as within the regime of the time-image, and extends our 
discussion of the possibilities of the free indirect mode. 
VOICELESS BODIES, BODILESS VOICES 
“The cinema of each period gets the acousmêtre it deserves.”74 —Michel Chion 
Whereas films in the social realism mold tend to focus on the lower rungs of the 
socioeconomic ladder, Mumblecore films are almost without exception limited to a middle-class, 
post-collegiate milieu. Writes critic Amy Taubin, “these non-actors are perfect choices for these 
films because their insecurity and embarrassment about voicing their characters’ ideas, desires, 
and feelings is not merely symptomatic of their lack of technique, it dovetails with a defining 
characteristic of the particular cohort (white, middle-class, twenty-something) to which the 
filmmakers and their quasi-fictional characters belong.”75 Taubin highlights what I consider to be 
one of the more interesting aspects of Mumblecore: the overlap between character and performer 
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becomes so considerable that the fiction of the film is grounded to an extent in the reality of the 
actor.  
The combination of, on the one hand, class and language and, on the other, director and 
character, returns us to the notion of free indirect. With Swanberg, however, we have not the 
Deleuzian becoming-other that characterizes George Washington, but rather a type of free 
indirect that is more akin to Pasolini’s theorization that Deleuze himself modified. The 
fundamental difference between the two models of the free indirect is that for Deleuze, the 
filmmaker and the subjects of the film must be of a different social “type”—which, it must be 
noted, is not an equivalent term to “class” for the philosopher—from one another so that they 
may undergo a mutual transformation. Pasolini, though, believed that the free indirect mode was 
only possible when those in front of and behind the camera were of the same (middle) class, that 
they must all be “exquisite flowers of the bourgeoisie.”76 It may be said then that the stakes of 
the free indirect for Pasolini is the awakening of class consciousness; for Deleuze, it is the 
obliteration of the boundaries of subjectivities. Swanberg’s Kissing on the Mouth is a particularly 
interesting case in that relationship between filmmaker and his subject aligns with Pasolini’s 
theories of the free indirect while producing an effect closer to that of Deleuze’s.  
Before delving more into the free indirect, we must first differentiate the work of 
Swanberg from some of his Mumblecore compatriots. As hinted at above, Swanberg is a 
controversial figure for his frequent and graphic depictions of what appears to be non-simulated 
sex. The director contends that this is not the gratuitous deployment of skin we see in, say, teen 
exploitation films; rather, Swanberg has suggested that Kissing was conceived as a rejoinder to 
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the Mumblecore progenitor, Andrew Bujalski’s Funny Ha Ha. Bujalski’s film concerns a young 
woman, Marnie, who pines for various men in her post-collegiate life, though few respond to her 
diffident flirtations. As Marnie finds herself in something of a hesitant love quadrangle, the most 
explosive “sparks” tend to be a stolen, awkward or misaligned kiss. Though both Kissing and 
Funny Ha Ha are concerned with the anomie of middle-class, Caucasian, hipsters, Swanberg 
latches on to precisely that which is elided in Bujalski’s film—sex. In Funny Ha Ha, sex is a 
subject that both the director and his characters seem to hesitantly dance around; with 
Swanberg’s characters, sex seems more “natural” than their conversations, which are often 
uncomfortable, clipped, evasive. Whereas the verbal exchange is fraught with peril, sex is at least 
a fleeting moment of shared interest or intersecting intention, of intercourse as discourse.  
Swanberg immediately cues the viewer that sex is on the agenda, that he is depicting the 
flip side of Bujalski’s chaste coin. First, the director ironically deploys the title Kissing on the 
Mouth for its association with callow hierarchies of intimacy (as in the clichéd baseball 
analogy—first base, second base, etc).  Secondly, before any dialogue is exchanged in the film, 
we are presented with first a man and a woman kissing, then a close-up shot of a condom being 
unrolled onto an erection. The title card of the film then appears over the characters in mid- and 
apparently non-simulated lovemaking. Clearly, Swanberg is dealing with something other than 
the sexless sweetness of Bujalski. 
 It would be easy to write off Swanberg if his adoption of a realist aesthetic were merely 
an attempt to elevate the pornographic to the art house—as many, in fact, have charged.77 Sex is, 
after all, one of the more “artificial” (that is, “unnatural”) of events in the cinema, calculated and 
                                            
77 Amy Taubin is one of the most outspoken critics of Swanberg, whom she describes as a “clueless [narcissist]” 
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choreographed to show some actions while obscuring other inactions. A facile consideration of 
realism might address the love scenes in such a manner.  However, what is most important about 
how Swanberg presents sex is that he does so in the same matter-of-fact manner that he depicts, 
for example, the washing of dishes. “We tried,” says Swanberg in an interview, “to make no 
separation between the way we filmed a body and the way we filmed a computer or a table. We 
left the imagination plenty of room to wander around when thinking about other elements of the 
film, but we did not think the imagination deserved anything in regards to the body.”78 In 
Kissing, graphic sex scenes are often followed by a character painting a room, taking out the 
garbage, or brushing his or her teeth. This tempering of the more explicit elements of Kissing 
with the quotidian and the commonplace connects Swanberg’s contemporary techniques to a 
long history of realist approaches, like the famous scene of the maid in Umberto D and, in 
perhaps an overt intertextual reference, the more contemporary work of Chantal Akerman. The 
use of temps morts has long been something of a cornerstone of realist cinemas, for it subverts 
the tendency of the classical (movement-image) film to insist that every scene or moment 
contribute or connect to the narrative arc. It is such a reliance on the banal that, as discussed in 
chapter 1, invites the spectator to productively experience boredom, to scan the frame for 
marginal details, to feel time passing.79  
 And yet, what is most unusual about Kissing on the Mouth is neither its sex scenes nor its 
banalities. Rather, what intrigues me is how Swanberg utilizes sound in the film, for he grants 
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the soundtrack a degree of autonomy from the visual and demonstrates possibilities in realist 
cinema that have yet to be fully considered.  
 Just as Swanberg announces his intentions to redress the staid lustfulness in Bujalski in 
the opening sex scene, he follows it in the subsequent scene with the introduction of a formal 
device that marks what I consider to be the film’s most striking deviation from our prototypical 
realist text. Swanberg, who plays the character Patrick in the film, is seen connecting audio 
equipment to his laptop computer. He sets a microphone on a table and begins interviewing 
someone else in the room, someone who remains off-screen. As we cut away from the interview 
scene, the voice of the subject carries over into the next. The identities of Patrick’s interlocutors 
(a total of four by movie’s end) are never revealed throughout the proceedings. This appears to 
be an intertextual reference to Godard’s Masculin-Féminin (1966) in which Jean-Pierre Léaud, 
playing a pollster, is off-screen peppering a young beauty contest winner with questions about 
politics and sex. Interestingly, Swanberg inverts the seen-unseen dynamic by showing only 
Patrick the interviewer and keeping the interviewees unseen. These lengthy responses are heard 
exclusively in the form of voice-over narration, though they never seem to “link up” to the film’s 
visual content or relate in any evident fashion to the narrative. In short, these voices form a 
running sound track to the visual that seem to only tangentially and in a thematic way relate to 
the visual track and its story.  
 We soon ascertain that Patrick is compiling something of an audio documentary, a series 
of interviews with people that, from what we can gather, are of a similar disposition as Patrick: 
middle-class, mid-twenties, college-educated, (most likely) white. In an interesting instance of 
reality intruding upon the fictional narrative, this audio was produced by Swanberg’s fellow 
filmmaker and co-star Kris Williams for a non-fiction project of her own, one that pre-dates the 
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beginning of production for Kissing on the Mouth. Swanberg appropriates this audio for his film, 
allowing it to “contaminate,” to use Pasolini’s term, the visuals. This, then, inverts Michel 
Chion’s concept of the “acousmêtre,” the voice that is heard but not seen in film. Chion attributes 
a number of “powers” to the acousmatic voice, such as a god-like transcendence that marks the 
voice as omniscient, transcendent.80 The acousmêtre attains its power by being “present” despite 
being “not-yet-seen”;81 yet, in Kissing on the Mouth, these voices never reveal themselves and 
are, thus, not visually linked with their physical sources. In this regard, they more obviously pair 
with the conventions of documentary narration, whereby an authoritative voice “issues from a 
space other than that on the screen, an unrepresented, undetermined space.”82 By disallowing 
these voices the status of third-person, omniscient narration and withholding the “de-
acousmatization,” Swanberg denies them any of the powers associated with the acousmêtre or 
the authority ceded to the documentary narrator. Joan Copjec would no doubt call these 
“intemporal voices: they cannot be situated in—nor submitted to the ravages of—time or 
place.”83 In short, these voices hang in limbo.  
 Thus, unlike conventional voice-overs, the audio and the visual elements of the film 
achieve a certain level of independence from one another; the voices that float over the images 
are not there to serve as interior monologue or commentary, nor do they align necessarily with 
the dramatic situations of the narrative (and when they do, it seems more serendipitous than by 
design). Instead, sound and visual operate as equals, neither subservient to the other. 
 And this is precisely the type of sound-image disjunction that intrigued Deleuze, as the 
de-linking of the sound and the visual is a crucial characteristic of the “pure optical and sound 
                                            
80 Chion, Voice in Cinema, 18-25. 
81 Ibid., 21. 
82 Joan Copjec, “The Phenomenal Nonphenomenal: Private Space in Film Noir,” in Shades of Noir, ed. Joan Copjec, 
(New York: Verso, 1993), 184.  
83 Ibid., 185. 
47 
 
situations” of the time-image. The shift from silent to sound cinema allows, according to 
Deleuze, the presentation of “direct” character speech (i.e., speech that is heard and synchronized 
with the moving lips of an actor, not speech conveyed via title card, which is an indirect 
method). Only when the sound film had overcome its early unsteady experiments did the speech-
act “[turn] in on itself” for “it [was] no longer dependent on something which is part of the visual 
image; it becomes a completely separate sound image; it takes on a cinematographic autonomy 
and cinema becomes truly audio-visual.”84 By being discreet and autonomous elements of a 
larger whole (i.e., an image), audio and visual attain the possibility of entering into a free indirect 
relationship with one another. It will become apparent in this and the following chapter the 
fundamental possibilities (not only cinematically but philosophically) that are opened up by this 
liberation of the sound from the visual. What’s more, these possibilities perhaps best illuminate 
the motivation for Deleuze’s foray into the cinema in relation to his larger philosophical project. 
We can chart the accretion of sound autonomy by tracing certain stylistic developments 
in film history. For instance, at its inception, the talkie locked the sound of the voice to the 
movement of the lips, and therefore shot selection and editing rhythms were dictated by who was 
speaking and when. Bit by bit, though, filmmakers began to free themselves from this limitation, 
this tethering of words and shots. Consider: the devices of the voiceover, which I’ve already 
alluded to, or the sound bridge, in which a character’s voice or a sound effect (a ringing school 
bell, say), heard at the conclusion of one scene, carries on into the next, one that may take place 
in a different spatial or temporal location. Instead of employing visual signifiers of transition 
(i.e., the wipe or the lap dissolve, to name but a few), we have the audio taking the lead, 
momentarily overcoming its general subordination to the visual. 
                                            
84 Deleuze, Cinema 2, 243. It bears repeating that for Deleuze everything is image. The term is not restricted to a 
visual representation, much as it is not limited to a single shot. A single image may be a series of shots, an entire 
scene, a whole film.  
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Deleuze identifies in the time-image an even greater degree of flexibility, as the aural 
component gains more than a brief “first-chair” status and instead becomes independent of the 
visual. This becomes evident for Deleuze with Last Year in Marienbad (Resnais, 1961), for it 
marks a point where “the talking and the visual were no longer held together, no longer 
corresponded, but belied and contradicted themselves, without it being possible to say that one 
rather than the other is ‘right.’”85 This passage is key for two reasons: first, it assigns neither the 
visual nor the aural a place of supremacy; secondly, the two components may contradict or 
falsify one another. Thus is born the “sound image” or “sonsign” which exists on either side of 
“a fault, an interstice, an irrational cut between” sound and image.86 This interval is, for Deleuze, 
the power of the cinema, for this space between is a locus of possibility, the site of viable 
becomings. Unlike the voice-over of an omniscient narrator that (usually) can be trusted, the 
sound image exists in an indiscernible, irrational relationship with the visual image.  
This irrationality is crucial to our understanding of the interview audio in Kissing on the 
Mouth. We have grown accustomed to the voice-over providing information, commentary, or 
otherwise framing that which we see, but this authoritative voice is, in the vast majority of cases, 
a diegetic one, part of the fictional world and often either the protagonist herself or a secondary 
character. In the film in question here, Swanberg utilizes “real” documentary audio and then 
places it in counterpoint to the fictional, visual world. The film self-consciously aligns reality 
with fiction and subverts the customary authority of the disembodied voice of the acousmêtre. 
What I call subversion, however, Deleuze describes as a necessary trade-off: 
Entering into rivalry or heterogeneity with the visual images, the voice-off no longer has 
the power which only exceeded these in so far as it defined itself in relation to its limits: 
it has lost the omnipotence which characterized it in the first stage of the talkie. It has 
ceased to see everything; it has become questionable, uncertain, ambiguous […] because 
                                            
85 Ibid., 250. 
86 Ibid., 251. 
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it has broken from its moorings with the visual images which delegated to it the 
omnipotence which they lacked. The voice-off loses its omnipotence but by gaining 
autonomy.87 
 
In short, two autonomous fields (sound, vision) transform one another through their combination, 
their becoming. 
Therefore, a film such as Kissing on the Mouth, which so fundamentally breaks with the 
conventional use of sound and its interplay with the visual image, requires a different sort of 
spectatorial engagement in order to make heads or tails of it. The at times contradictory nature of 
this interplay creates what Rodowick calls a “set of contingent possibilities,” numerous in this 
instance: the interviews are irrelevant to the images, or they are marginally related commentary, 
or the documentary audio somehow inspired (called forth) the visuals, or perhaps vice-versa.88 
The film, then, becomes akin to trying to simultaneously train each of one’s eyes on different 
phenomena in the same space: at one moment they are discreet events, another, as the eyes 
inevitably “cross,” they bleed over into each other. The film becomes what Deleuze termed a 
“lectosign,” an image that has become legible, a “space for reading: seeing and hearing as 
decipherment rather than following an action.”89  
The unusual relationship between the visual and aural is not simply a formal anomaly or 
stylistic device, either. In fact, the “conflict” between the two becomes doubly inscribed, as it is 
made manifest in the characters of Patrick, our audio collector, and Chris (Kevin Pittman), a 
photographer, both of whom vie for the affection of the evasive Ellen (Kate Winterwich). Patrick 
not-so-secretly longs for Ellen, his roommate, who has recently rekindled a relationship with 
Chris, her former boyfriend. Initially, Ellen hides her trysts with Chris from her prying friend, 
                                            
87 Ibid., 250. Note that the French voix-off subsumes both the English voice-off (i.e., a character within the scene 
who speaks but is not seen, as in, say, a reaction shot of the other party) and the voice-over, which is, in effect, a 
disembodied voice, one detached from the scene yet privileged to speak. 
88 Rodowick, Deleuze’s Time Machine, 75. 
89 Ibid. 
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Patrick, aware of both his disapproval and affection for her. Nevertheless, Patrick finds film 
negatives of a nude Ellen from a recent photo session with Chris, letting the proverbial cat out of 
the bag. Ellen makes it clear to the disapproving Patrick that she is bored and lonely and intends 
her new involvement with Chris to be of a purely sexual nature. However, Chris soon desires 
more of Ellen than sex, such as the ever-so-complicated Mumblecore obstacle of conversation. 
Though it is tempting to disregard the creative occupations of Chris and Patrick as tropes 
of this mumbling hipster genre, I contend it is more productive to instead think of them in terms 
of the shared ontological nature of their respective artistic media—that is, methods of capture or 
containment. Chris, a nascent fashion photographer, is seen on multiple occasions photographing 
models whom he painstakingly orders into just-so positions. Thus, our photographer dictates 
both the pose and framing before “freezing” the moment, halting time and space and his model 
within it. Unlike the loosened approach of the filmmakers discussed in this study, Chris attempts 
to eliminate contingency by creating the most tightly controlled of environments.90 It is 
especially significant that Ellen initially rebuffs his attempts to photograph her and, as we gather, 
never agreed to pose during their original, more traditional courtship. By acquiescing, though, 
Ellen is “pinned down” via representation in a way that she staunchly refuses in “reality”; yet, in 
submitting to Chris’s lens, she becomes, in a sense, a possession, locked into an ideal pose and 
according to his preferences.91  
These photographs become for Ellen a two-fold predicament: primarily, they incorrectly 
signal to Chris her desire to engage in a bona fide, sincere relationship; consequently, by Patrick 
exhuming them, she submits to his prying gaze and badgering demands to defend her actions. 
                                            
90 Cf. the photographer in Antonioni’s Blow-up (1966) who, upon venturing outside his studio, finds the world of 
contingencies cannot be molded to fit his ideal narrative.  
91 The fantasy elements of photography, posing, and possession will also be central to Swanberg’s second feature 
LOL, where one character forgoes a relationship with a “real” woman in favor of a virtual relationship with an 
online amateur porn star. 
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Moreover, being that Ellen has no interest in either a short- or long-term physical relationship 
with Patrick, the pictures become for him a particularly stinging reminder of the unattainability 
of the object of his desire. But might there be another way for Patrick? 
Much as Ellen does with her relationship with Chris, Patrick keeps secret the interviews 
he is compiling, which suggests that he is embarrassed for Ellen to know about his preoccupation 
with love and sex that colors his project. However, mirroring Patrick’s discovery of the nude 
photos, Ellen finds and then copies the files that Patrick leaves open on his computer, thereby 
surreptitiously gaining access to his covert collection of voices that flow throughout the film. At 
the conclusion of Kissing, Ellen finds herself unexpectedly hurt by Chris rejection of her in favor 
of one of his other “models.” Echoing our first glimpse, we see Patrick in the final scene again 
setting up his microphone and prompting yet another unseen interviewee to tell him about her 
“last relationship.” Over the ending credits, we hear (but do not see) Ellen begin to tell the story 
of her affair with Chris. In so doing, she submits to the second of her suitors, this time in voice 
and not in image or in body. It is Patrick who now “possesses” Ellen’s voice, her thoughts, in a 
recording that is permeated with the type of intimacy that Chris sought and that Ellen was 
unwilling to give. And thus, the voice of Ellen, a fictional character, joins the chorus of the 
“real” voices that contaminated the film from the beginning; the “real” Kate Winterich and her 
character Ellen effectively switch positions. 
The importance of this late-film shift is, of course, two-fold. As we’ve seen, the 
acousmatic voices of the film are paradoxically both inside and outside the diegesis, for they’ve 
been incorporated into the narrative despite having been recorded before the genesis of Kissing 
on the Mouth: the voices are therefore outside of and prior to the fiction of the film. 
Consequently, we may align the realm of these disembodied voices with the “real world” while 
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designating the film’s visuals as the scripted fiction. Ellen, by becoming invisible, contaminates 
and, in Deleuze’s framework, falsifies the realm that had heretofore been coded as real. Thus, 
just as the voices heard throughout the film belonged to both realms, so too does the fictional 
Ellen. This incompossibility is achieved only through sound and image being detached from the 
other in autonomy.  
“WHAT DO YOU WANT SAID?” 
“[C]inema must press forward into the new century, by taking into itself the subject matter that 
surrounds it, increasingly a new media culture.”92 —Dudley Andrew 
 
 Among academics, critics, journalists, and practitioners, the arrival of the digital to the 
realm of cinema was seen as an ambiguous harbinger: on the one hand, the possibility of 
affordably owning the means of production was trumpeted by some as the coming of the great 
utopian moment for “indie” filmmaking, while on the other, many bemoaned the death of the 
medium with the almost certain obsolescence of celluloid and its concomitant obliteration of the 
Bazinian ontology. Mumblecore is positioned directly between these two discourses, for the bulk 
of the films associated with the movement were made without outside financing and still 
managed to find theatrical and/or DVD distribution. At the same time, most Mumblecore films 
adhere to a realist aesthetic, eschewing green screens and CGI for a more traditional art cinema 
approach. But how might we approach the digital as not just a technology—a means to an end—
but as a logic?  
 Premiering on the festival circuit in 2005 along with Kissing on the Mouth, Arin 
Crumley’s and Susan Buice’s Four Eyed Monsters proves an instructive example, for it 
foregrounds the digital in terms of aesthetics and as an approach to the world. In so doing, the 
film opens a path for us to consider Deleuze’s time-image in relation to the digital, a technology 
                                            
92 Dudley Andrew, What Cinema Is!, 94. 
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that he only briefly (and perhaps presciently) discusses in the Cinema books. “The electronic 
image,” writes Deleuze, 
that is, the tele and the video image, the numerical image coming into being, either had to 
transform cinema or to replace it, to mark its death. We do not claim to be producing an 
analysis of the new images, which would be beyond our aims, but only to indicate certain 
effects whose relation to the cinematographic image remains to be determined.93  
 
The conflict between the analog and digital image that Deleuze presaged as germane to his 
project only came to a head after his death. These numerical images are precisely those that I 
wish to pursue here. However, before we may tackle the problem of the digital, we must first 
consider how Four Eyed Monsters operates within Deleuze’s framework. I will return to the 
question of digital cinema at the conclusion of this chapter.  
 Four Eyed Monsters is, on its surface, a broadly-pitched autobiographical romantic 
comedy about the “real life” courtship of its filmmakers Crumly and Buice, who, prior to the 
success of the film, were, in keeping with the artistic inclination of Mumblecore characters, a 
struggling freelance videographer and painter, respectively.94 The title derives from a voiceover 
that opens the film, where couples are referred to as monsters with four eyes, eight limbs, two 
mouths. In the romantic partnership, two people become one entity, fleetingly resurrecting the 
primal beings Aristophanes described in Plato’s Symposium, the unified bodies that were split by 
Zeus’ bolts, which ultimately initiates the longing for wholeness that may only be achieved 
through a coupling, a unification. The film’s over-arching metaphor sets up something akin to a 
Deleuzian becoming, a metamorphosis in which separate entities make one by becoming the 
other. According to the filmic narrative, Crumly and Buice met on a social networking website 
and upon finding face-to-face interaction awkward, vow to only communicate via non-verbal 
                                            
93 Deleuze, Cinema 2, 265. 
94 Being that the filmmakers play characters who share their names, I will throughout this analysis refer to the 
directors by the surnames (Buice and Crumley) and their narrative counterparts by the first names (Susan and Arin) 
in an effort to avoid confusion of the “real” and the “fictional” individuals. 
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forms: text messages, emails, video diaries, and hand-written notes passed between them on 
subway trains. Thus, the film aligns with the Mumblecore preoccupation with communicative 
shortcomings. However, something far more interesting is at stake here, for it conceives of a 
particular type of free indirect discourse that is outside Deleuze’s formulation. More importantly, 
this sort of indirect relationship is abetted by the digital technologies that are embraced by the 
characters and put to use by the filmmakers. 
 Four Eyed Monsters announces its formal ambitions early in the film by shifting between 
live-action scenes of Buice and Crumley playing themselves and animated sequences that seem 
to accomplish the task of depicting moments that were either too expensive to “re-create” on 
such a small budget or that serve to convey Susan’s or Arin’s interior thoughts without resorting 
to voice-over narration or the clumsy secondary character-as-sounding board of romantic 
comedy convention. However, these glimpses of character interiority are immensely complicated 
by the dual authorship of the film, for they beg the question of which of the directors/characters 
we can attribute the information conveyed. For instance, the film imparts to us that Arin, prior to 
meeting Susan, was sexually inexperienced; this is evinced by a faux-web profile that displays 
the avatars of three women, each of which takes turns explaining, as if being interviewed on the 
topic, Arin’s sexual foibles (premature ejaculation, performance anxiety, etc). In this instance, it 
is most likely that Crumley is using the obviously fictional interviews as a novel approach to 
character exposition. Yet, this same technique is deployed later in relation to Susan, but in this 
instance authorial attribution becomes much muddier. Following a shot of Arin, we cut to a 
leather-bound sketch book, one which whimsically flips itself open to reveal the interior pages, 
each dedicated to sketches of former boyfriends of Susan. These pages “cue” a video interview, 
where the men recount the demise of their relationships with our protagonist. A high school 
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partner describes having sex with Susan in a number of unusual locations (teacher’s desk, a 
friend’s back yard, etc.) which seems to speak to Arin’s anxiety and inexperience. Thus, it might 
be assumed that Crumley is still the dominant point-of-view, the enunciator of the cinematic 
utterance, despite the association between Susan and pencil drawings established earlier in the 
film. Yet, this same beau, while smiling and laughing, recalls how Susan’s parents took out a 
restraining order against him. It is at this point that the interview takes a pronounced turn into 
darker territory. The boyfriend confesses that Susan’s parents didn’t like him “even before [he] 
hit her.” He goes on to matter-of-factly—chuckling, even—describe his battery of her: “Yes, I 
beat her up, split her lip, gave her a black eye.” The film’s visuals suggest at first that Buice is 
helming this sequence, but this is then called into question by the interviewee’s volunteering of 
information that contributes to Arin’s sexual unease. Then again, the clashing of tone between 
what might be Arin’s comic imagining of the sexual prowess of Susan’s former partner 
alarmingly shifts into a far too cavalier admission of assault. Surely Arin wouldn’t “invent” such 
a disquieting backstory, nor would Susan (or Buice) supply it so off-handedly.  
 Thus, we have arrived once again at the notion of free indirect discourse, where, in 
Deleuze’s theorization, the director speaks through the character, though in the character’s 
dialect. With Four Eyed Monsters, the question then becomes which of the characters or which 
of the directors; no simple answer exists, for the two characters and the two filmmakers are, 
ultimately, the same people. Thus, the distinguishing factor between Pasolini’s account of the 
free indirect (director and subject occupying the same or similar “anthropological type” or class) 
and Deleuze’s (difference) becomes obliterated by Buice and Crumley turning the camera onto 
themselves. As a result, we cannot with any degree of certainty attribute the “utterance” of these 
interviews to either author or either protagonist. It may be said, then, that Susan and Arin, the 
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characters, and Buice and Crumly, the directors, have entered into a free indirect relationship 
with themselves. 
 By creating falsifying narratives about one another, Buice and Crumly make manifest the 
process of crossing over from sides of the camera that signaled for Deleuze the political power of 
the cinema. In the final moments of the film, as the couple attempts to come to grips with 
whether their relationship exists as a romantic partnership or as a communicative experiment, 
Arin scribbles a note to Susan, one that is especially ironic given the nature of the film’s digital 
recording—“I’m going to film it.” We then see a montage sequence that drastically re-organizes 
our perception of what transpired previously. In reverse time-lapse photography, shots that were 
displayed earlier in the film are disassembled before our eyes: the restaurant where Susan 
supposedly waited tables is revealed to be a crude set constructed in a loft apartment; in a slow 
track out, the couple dismantle the loft bed we earlier saw them share; Crumly and Buice are 
depicted eating lunch while editing the raw footage that became scenes from the first two-thirds 
of the film. Over a shot of the directors constructing a storyboard, we hear Crumly in voiceover 
say “we’ve got all the writings, and the drawings and the videos, so let’s make this into 
something.” Therefore, what initially appears as a loose autobiographical retelling of their 
relationship becomes a blending of staged events, animation, and documentary footage—
“primary sources” of their odd, albeit “real,” courtship. And yet, in retrospect (and even in 
subsequent viewings) we cannot be entirely sure which images were recycled, which were re-
enacted, and which were simply “made up” to help the narrative cohere. The film is at once 
“real” and simultaneously “fiction”, and though these two realms are discreet, we cannot discern 
their differences. In short, the entire narrative falsifies itself.    
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Deleuze describes a remarkably similar process to that which transpires in Four Eyed 
Monsters in relation to Godard’s Masculin-Féminin, wherein “the fictional interview with the 
characters and the real interview with actors mix together so that they seem to be speaking to 
each other, and to speak for themselves, by speaking to the filmmaker.”95 He goes on to say that  
It is under these conditions of the time-image that the same transformation involves the 
cinema of fiction and the cinema of reality and blurs their differences; in the same 
movement, descriptions become pure, purely optical and sound, narrations falsifying, and 
stories, simulations. The whole cinema becomes free indirect discourse, operating in 
reality.96 
 
 It would seem, then, that Deleuze sees the concept of simulation in a far more positive 
light than his contemporary Baudrillard, whose Simulacra and Simulation was released in France 
in the same year (1985) as Deleuze’s The Time-Image. The very possibility of free indirect 
discourse is predicated upon a mimetic appropriation of the speech of another; hence, this 
simulation is not, as Baudrillard might claim, the postmodern death of the referent at the hands of 
its copy but is rather the birth of (the potential of) a becoming.   
 According to Deleuze, the powers of the false are unleashed when the filmmaker 
becomes his subject and the subject becomes the filmmaker in a constant oscillation. Such a 
shifting of positions is made manifest in Four Eyed Monsters’ concluding montage. In one 
particular shot, we see the reenactment (or perhaps the document?) of an earlier scene’s creation. 
Crumly, standing in the bathroom, removes his t-shirt as Buice sits below training a video 
camera at him. Thus, this shot contains two cameras—the one visible in Susan’s hands and the 
one implied by the frame (see fig. 9). (The shot purports to be a documentary of the film’s 
creation, a “behind-the-scenes” featurette, if you will.) This mise-en-abyme is repeated later in 
the sequence, this time with Crumley recording Buice, camera number one and the implicated 
                                            
95 Deleuze, Cinema 2, 154.  
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second that defines the outer frame present once again. Thus, the two authors of the film literally 
shift positions in one sense, as they take turns as actor and as camera operator (see fig. 10). In 
another regard, they always remain the subjects of the shot, fitting since their coupling is the 
subject of the film.  
 
Figure 9. Buice (right) plays herself recording Crumly in a simulacrum of a shot that does not 
exist.97 
 
Thus, the film’s reliance on these simulacra, these copies of copies that may or may not 
have  “originals,” are fundamental to the falsifying narratives of Buice and Crumley. What’s 
more, this literal proliferation of images within the film mirrors the ever-growing ubiquity of the 
visual image in the postmodern. That the two filmmakers were compelled to operate according to 
a logic of representation —a series of emails, video journals, self-portraits—is symptomatic of 
the larger postmodern image culture. It becomes, then, part and parcel of their everyday 
experience of the world. Thus, it is impossible for Buice and Crumly to tell their story without 
relying upon the methods by which they communicate amongst themselves.    
                                            
97 This and all subsequent images from Four Eyed Monsters are digital frame captures by the author. Four Eyed 
Monsters. DVD. Directed by Arin Crumley and Susan Buice. 2005; New York: self-distributed, 2006. 
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Figure 10. Buice (left), in a role reversal from the previous shot, now acts while Crumly (back 
right) records. 
 
 This is not to say, however, that the oscillation between Crumly and Buice in the role of 
originator of the cinematic enunciation is an “even” exchange. In fact, perhaps the most 
fascinating aspect of the film is the tension that exists between Crumly’s naïve optimism and 
Buice’s insistence on littering the proceedings with brief flashes of her past (and even current) 
victimizations that momentarily rupture the otherwise bubbly, sentimental film. These 
momentary breaches serve to subvert the narrative flow that seems at times to be dominated by 
Crumley. 
 I remarked above of the alarming revelation of Susan’s abuse at the hands of an ex-
boyfriend. This is but one example of her backstory that pushes against the romantic tone of the 
rest of the film. Early on, when Arin first contacts Susan via email requesting additional pictures 
of her, Susan suggests instead that he simply come to the restaurant where she waits tables to see 
her in person. Arin obliges, but, overcome with anxiety, he departs from the eatery without even 
saying “hello.” He does, however, stake out the restaurant waiting for Susan’s shift to end. He 
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then follows her with his video camera in hand, recording her trek home from behind garbage 
cans and bus stops. Arin emails his clandestine documentary under the heading “Stalking Susan” 
to his video’s subject, who, instead of being repulsed, finds it charming. Despite her implied 
history of physical abuse, Susan, surprisingly, welcomes a self-designated stalker into her life. 
 The free indirect nature of Susan and Arin’s relationship creates a number of moments 
within the narrative when Susan’s “true” feelings become ambiguous. For instance, soon after 
the couple first sleep together, Arin discovers a wart on his genitals that is later diagnosed as 
herpes. Given his limited sexual experience and Susan’s implied extensive number of intimate 
partners, Arin confronts her (by scribbling on a pad, of course), accusing her of transmitting to 
him the disease. Following a two-shot of the couple “talking,” we cut to a fantasy sequence in 
which we see Susan, dressed in black leather and an abundance of mascara, seductively straddle 
and then lick a subway pole, all the while facing the camera to break the fourth wall. This 
sequence is intercut with images of cockroaches crawling across a table, one of which is later 
shown pinned beneath a drinking glass. To whom do we attribute these images? The easy answer 
is Arin, whom we can assume is turned off by the “tainted” Susan. But what if this sequence was 
cued by Susan in response to Arin’s rejection of her?  
 Susan, if read in relation to her abusive past, becomes a far more enigmatic figure than 
she at first appears. Consequently, throwaway lines and anomalistic behaviors can be seen as the 
briefest of glimpses into her subjectivity, glimpses which help explain her curious attachment to 
Arin and her willingness to go along with his “experiment.” Take, for example, Susan’s 
confessional video sent to Arin where she explains her fear that she is not an artist and will thus 
be stuck in her table-waiting job forever. Susan, doubly boxed in by a tight close-up of a 
camcorder’s viewfinder replaying her video diary, initiates a litany of annoying questions she 
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typically receives at the restaurant, some of which sync with her lips and others that are 
disjointed and emerge as if out of the ether. All the while, digital time code counts upward, 
obscuring her face (see fig. 11). These banal questions are juxtaposed with far more crude 
queries: “Can you steam my broccoli with no oil and no butter?” “Do you have herpes?” “Can I 
get that with cheese?” “Can I see what kind of underwear you have on?” “Can I get that with 
dressing on the side?” “Would your pussy get wet if I touched it?” In each instance, the more 
coarse questions do not emanate from Susan’s mouth; instead, they emerge from the soundtrack 
between the visible utterances, speaking aloud the otherwise unspeakable.   
 
Figure 11. Buice’s video journal where her spoken banalities are juxtaposed with crude, 
asynchronous come-ons 
 
 This is not to propose that Susan can be summed up as suffering from a “victim 
mentality.” Rather, I merely posit that the film offers us enough evidence to suggest that Susan’s 
participation in the production of Four Eyed Monsters is an act of acquiescence. But in going 
along with the more dominant Arin, Susan provides momentary flashes of commentary that 
subvert Crumley’s control over the film and, thus, over Susan/Buice as well. For the briefest of 
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instants, Susan presses back against the narrative that has been constructed around her. With 
Crumley behind the camera and Susan in front, our heroine resists easy categorization and, in a 
sense, refuses to let Crumley speak his words through her. Their collective enunciation of their 
own true story is momentarily subverted or falsified by one of its authors. Buice, it might be said, 
provides enough discordant notes to allow for an alternative reading that cuts against the grain of 
the film’s light comedic tone. 
 Susan’s resistance, usually quite subtle, appears in its most pronounced form in the 
rapidly-cut, concluding montage. Susan, in what appears (though we cannot be certain) a non-
staged event, cries while speaking to Arin offscreen. “I feel like such an asshole,” she says, “for 
not just making a decision on my own, but I don’t know how to.” The sequence ends on an 
image of Arin and Susan sitting before a microphone in a sound studio. The couple are arguing 
over the proper way to record an introduction to the DVD version of the film, which, raising 
questions of digital exhibition that this study cannot hope to pursue, contains in its finished form 
this exact altercation. Crumley instructs Buice to lean into the microphone, to hold back her 
objections, and speak in a calm manner into the mic. In response to his coaxing, Buice replies, in 
a clear shift from Susan the actor to Buice the co-director, “Arin, I’m talking to you right now. I 
will do whatever it takes to get this stupid fucking intro out there. So what do you want said?” 
These final words are key, for with them, Buice acknowledges quite literally the free indirect 
nature of their authoring/acting relationship. Crumley speaks his words through Buice, furnishes 
her with the utterance.  If Four Eyed Monsters marks a mutual becoming between Susan and 
Arin, as both romantic partners and authoring co-directors, it is to some extent, a reluctant one.  
Four Eyed Monsters is certainly an unusual case, for it moves our discussion to the 
question of the digital. Against the falling-sky notion that digital technologies would be the death 
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of cinema, we find here what Deleuze might describe as a “mutation of form,” one that presents 
to us a “new image,” one that owes itself not simply to its method of recording but also its 
content, the logic by which it comes into being.98 The omnipresence of cheap, unobtrusive means 
of recording (cell phones, digital camcorders), disseminating (email, YouTube) and storing (hard 
drives, the celestial “cloud”) have abetted a particular urge that finds articulation in Four Eyed 
Monsters, an urge to archive on the one hand and to narrativize, recombine, or “mash-up” on the 
other. The proliferating technologies of vision have contributed to, as Benjamin might say, the 
“aestheticization” of our day-to-day lives. Thus, the rise of the digital exacerbates a number of 
the characteristics we’ve come to associate with the postmodern.  
 Though much of Mumblecore has been derided as solipsistic navel-gazing on the part of 
its filmmakers, these films are significant if for no other reason in that they are among the first to 
depict characters who are so firmly entrenched in the digital realm as to suggest that this realm is 
perhaps the only arena in which they can cope with their material world. While critics bemoan 
the Mumblecore films as too insular and narrowly-focused on the world of white, middle-class, 
urban hipsters, it is precisely this lack of breadth that allows us to isolate this particularly acute 
symptom of the postmodern condition.  
Pasolini, whom, we will recall, Deleuze borrowed heavily from in his own theorization of 
cinematic free indirect discourse, locates within Godard’s work a perhaps similar set of 
circumstances that is arising in Mumblecore. In his “Cinema of Poetry” essay, Pasolini singles 
out Godard’s characters’ emerging middle class sensibilities as the “birth of a new 
anthropological type,” a type characterized by a “dominant condition” of neurosis.99 Pasolini, a 
steadfast Marxist, suggests that this birth is the result of economic modernization and the 
                                            
98 Ibid., 265. 
99 Pasolini, “Cinema of Poetry,” 181. 
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establishment of a consumerist middle class. Amid this historical reconfiguration, Godard’s 
particular brand of free indirect discourse was able to take shape. Deleuze, however, locates the 
historical shift that predicates the free indirect mode not as economic in nature but rather with the 
destruction that accompanied the Second World War.  
 Despite their disagreement as to the “cause” of these new images, what is crucial is that 
both ground them in historically determined events. Quite surprisingly, though, the term “new 
anthropological type” predates both men, for Adorno, in a still unpublished manuscript, was 
using the phrase as early as 1942, thereby highlighting a similar set of concerns.  Writes George 
Cavalletto, summarizing the largely unseen document: 
Adorno wrote that the historical and psychological changes of recent history were so 
massive that they constituted a veritable anthropological change in the historically 
conditioned "nature" of humankind. With the downfall of entrepreneurial capitalism, he 
asserted, came "a new anthropological type," a fundamentally new type of human being, 
with new social functions and a new type of psychic formation. In the case of this new 
anthropological type, the role of repression in the formation of psychic structure had been 
replaced by the immediate gratifications of mass culture.100  
 
Though we cannot know for certain whether the latter thinkers had read Adorno’s words on the 
matter, what is most important is that they all three point to a similar condition, a similar shift in 
human subjectivity.  
 We’ve seen that, even despite the complaints of amateurish production values, the 
Mumblecore films under analysis here are nevertheless novel in their modifications to the free 
indirect mode as practiced by Antonioni, Godard, and others. Might we then say that, amid such 
a highly specific social milieu, these characters (played so often as they are by the filmmakers 
themselves) are constitutive of a new anthropological type? Further, might we owe these new 
images to the shifting historical circumstances surrounding their production, specifically the 
                                            
100 George Cavalletto, Crossing the Psycho-Social Divide: Freud, Weber, Adorno, and Elias (Burlington, VT: 
Ashgate Publishing, 2007), 142. 
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advent of the digital as both method of image capture and as an alternative, virtual space, one 
that, to adopt Adorno’s words, allows for “new social functions” and “the immediate 
gratifications of mass culture”? That these films are quite explicit in their meta-cinematic 
preoccupations while simultaneously grappling with the problems of realism, I contend we can 
trace yet another of Deleuze’s “mutations,” evolutions of the filmic image to the “numerical 
image coming into being.”101  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
101 Deleuze, Cinema 2, 265. 
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CHAPTER 3 
INSIDE, OUTSIDE, IN BETWEEN 
“The sounds and voices that are neither entirely inside nor clearly outside are those that interest 
me most … because it is with these sounds and voices left to wander the surface of the screen 
that the real and specific power of the cinema comes into play.”102—Michel Chion 
 
 There is a scene at the midpoint of Gus Van Sant’s Last Days (2005), a long take that is 
indeed its centerpiece moment, bravura in its simplicity.103 Nearly five-minutes in length, this 
scene epitomizes much of the director’s stylistic approach in what I will call his late realist 
phase. The shot begins outside the window of a castle-like house as Blake (Michael Pitt), a 
fictional approximation of the late rock icon Kurt Cobain, coarsely begins to play a guitar. As the 
camera initiates a track in reverse, the musical notes repeat continuously despite the fact that 
Blake has now put down the instrument. We see the waifish blonde figure move to the opposite 
side of the room where he grabs a second guitar; a different riff rings out, ceases briefly, then 
begins again. It becomes apparent that our Cobain stand-in is playing the roles of conductor and 
orchestra, “looping” these disparate sounds to play end-on-end. He moves to the microphone 
and, in a marked change from his incoherent, heroin-hindered mutterings in the film’s first half, 
unleashes a guttural wail that, too, cycles on with the other repeating instruments. Next at the 
drum set, Blake bangs out an unsteady rhythm, which, once looped, manages to bring these 
fragments of noise into a crude coherence. Blake, heretofore dazed, expressionless, meek, is now 
at his most intelligible and expressive. All the while, though, the camera has continued its 
movement away, so that as the shot concludes we can no longer see inside the window. When 
the enigmatic ghost of Cobain is most open to our curious gaze, we are too far removed to catch 
                                            
102 Chion, Voice in Cinema, 4; emphasis in original. 
103 Daniel Cockburn has treated this scene at greater length and in dazzling fashion. My reading is very much 
informed by his. Daniel Cockburn, “Random Sample,” Reverse Shot 21 (2006), 
http://www.reverseshot.com/article/last_days. 
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a glimpse. But the grievous song remains as present to the ear as it was four-and-a-half minutes 
earlier, as if we were front-row, crouched in front of Blake’s squealing amplifier. 
 This distanced approach to his characters has long been a trait of Van Sant’s work. Take, 
for instance, the blank, ambivalent Mexican boy Johnny (Doug Cooyate) in Mala Noche  
(1985), the young hustlers in My Own Private Idaho (1991), the murderous misfits in Elephant 
(2003): all are confounding, alluring, begging to be “figured out,” and yet Van Sant leaves them 
as riddles. We may track this tendency throughout his career, but it is most pronounced in the 
late realist phase that to which I’ve alluded. Van Sant lends himself to such periodizations, for 
few careers can be mapped in such divergent directions: New Queer Cinema (Mala Noche, My 
Own Private Idaho), “indie” (Drugstore Cowboy [1989]), Hollywood “A-list” (Good Will 
Hunting [1997], Milk [2008]), and, in perhaps his greatest auteurial oddity, his near shot-for-shot 
remake of Hitchcock’s Psycho (1998).  
 Though a curious career choice, Van Sant’s Psycho is, in Janet Staiger’s estimation, 
entirely in line with his unique modus operandi: namely, his penchant for repetition and 
recombination, tactics she describes as common among postmodern minority authors.104 In fact, 
Staiger regards much of the director’s corpus as a series of remakes: My Own Private Idaho can 
be read as a remake of Orson Welles’ Chimes At Midnight (1965), itself an appropriation of 
Henry IV. Similarly, Finding Forrester (2000) is Van Sant remaking his own Good Will Hunting 
and Elephant a take on Alan Clarke’s 1989 BBC film of the same name, and so forth.105 
 It would seem, then, that Van Sant is clearly operating within the “logic of the 
simulacrum,” trafficking in images and texts in an effort to grasp an impossible-to-remember 
                                            
104 Van Sant is openly gay. 
105 Janet Staiger, “Authorship Studies and Gus Van Sant,” Film Criticism 29 (2004): 1-22. 
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past.106 While Van Sant is an avowed postmodern practitioner, there exists a conflicting tension 
within his work.107 Absent is the borrowing from other texts “randomly and without principle” 
that so characterizes the postmodern.108  Rather, Van Sant’s pillaging is quite purposeful, for it 
puts his work in conversation with the past as he attempts to grapple with some of the cinema’s 
oldest problems. That is to say, there exists within Van Sant’s films twin and contradictory 
tendencies—on the one hand, a penchant for ironic distantiation and, on the other, a probing 
curiosity towards his subjects. These two impulses, I will argue, come to a head in Van Sant’s 
“death trilogy”—a trio of films (Gerry [2002], Elephant [2003], and Last Days [2005]) that 
marks his return to the art house after his Hollywood phase. More importantly, this trilogy also 
signals Van Sant’s reverting back to a more realist approach that characterized his debut film, 
Mala Noche (1985). In returning to his roots, so to speak, Van Sant concomitantly arrives at an 
aesthetic crossroads that once again raises the question of the limitations of realism. However, 
with Paranoid Park (2007), his first post-trilogy feature, Van Sant, I will argue, overcomes the 
subjective-objective tension that plays itself out within the trilogy. In so doing, Van Sant 
positions himself within a scarcely recognized tradition of realist cinema that concerns itself not 
with social realities but psychic interiors, the inside of things.  
 In this section, I will read closely both Paranoid Park and Elephant, for their similarities 
are many: a focus on high school characters, a cast of non-actors, fractured chronology, 
atmospheric visuals, and an inventive, idiosyncratic use of sound. However, Elephant, much like 
its fellow trilogy members, keeps its characters at a distance, never lets us in. Thus, in Elephant, 
Van Sant slams against the hurdles that he ultimately clears in Paranoid Park. Following a 
                                            
106 Frederic Jameson, Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 1991): 18. 
107 Staiger, “Authorship Studies,” 9. 
108 Jameson,  Postmodernism 19. 
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similar pattern as the films in the two preceding chapters, the “solution” lies not simply in the 
image, but in sound, in noises, in voices.109  
LANGUAGE IN/AND CRISIS 
 Much like Van Sant’s Last Days is a rumination on death inspired by the suicide of Kurt 
Cobain, Elephant is a fictional take on an actual event, the 1999 Columbine High School 
massacre. Van Sant follows (both figuratively, as in a chronicle, and literally with his camera) 
several high school students in the moments just prior to and during the shootings. These 
characters, perhaps borrowed from the John Hughes playbook, are all archetypal: Nathan 
(Nathan Tyson), the popular jock; Carrie (Carrie Finklea), likewise popular, pretty; John (John 
Robinson), the shaggy-haired blonde misfit, an apparent riff on Jeff Spicoli; Elias (Elias 
McConnell), the artsy photographer; Brittany (Brittany Mountain), Jordan (Jordan Taylor), and 
Nicole (Nicole George), a triumvirate of vacuous bulimics; Michelle (Kristen Hicks), the 
“invisible” nerd; and, finally, Alex (Alex Frost) and Eric (Eric Deulen), the unpopular kids who 
ultimately open fire on their teachers and fellow students à la Dylan Klebold and Eric Harris of 
Columbine infamy.  
Elephant is structured as a series of loops: characters are followed in long  
tracking shots as they wander the hallways of their suburban Portland high school in the 
moments prior to the start of the attacks. Van Sant conveys that these walks are occurring 
simultaneously by carefully planting anchoring points throughout the film—conspicuous events 
that will be seen again in order to signify the repetition of the moment, though from another 
                                            
109 For another take on Elephant that begins from a similar premise (neorealism) but arrives at a far different 
conclusion, see Thomas Stubblefield, “Re-creating the Witness: Elephant, Postmodernism, and the Neorealist 
Inheritance,” in Italian Neorealism and Global Cinema, eds. Laura E. Roberto and Kristi M. Wilson (Detroit: 
Wayne State University Press, 2007), 226-241. 
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perspective.110 Let us return to by-now familiar theoretical ground: these anchors make manifest 
Deleuze’s crystal-image, for they form the shared point of multiple trajectories. We see this most 
explicitly when Michelle, Elias, and John pass each other in the hallway, an event that, in a 
sequential conception of time, occurs only once; in Elephant, this occurrence is repeated three 
times, in a tracking shot “attached” to each of three characters. Their steadicam-accompanied 
walks are each facets of the film’s crystal, facets that momentarily, through intersection, share a 
point or a line before diverging in differing directions. 
 We have, then, a quite interesting variation on the long-take aesthetic; in most cases, to 
follow one character is to the exclusion of all others. However, with Elephant, we trail every 
character, both major and minor, in (and through) approximately the same portion of time. One 
might think that by having every angle available to us, every inch of the school corridors 
traveled, the tragedy would lay itself bare for our understanding. This formal strategy of 
repetition, however, fails to illuminate the situation. Instead of parallel montage which conveys a 
spectatorial mastery of space and time—here in the library, meanwhile, in the cafeteria—, we are 
given a collection of viewpoints, viewpoints which cohere to give us the sequence of events but 
never a master narrative or interpretation.  
 There are certain formal consistencies within these loops or facets. First, with few 
exceptions, the performers lead the tracking camera, the spectator largely watching them from 
behind. This approach is characteristic of Van Sant’s holding at arm’s length the characters of 
the trilogy, as we are rarely granted close-ups and, when we are, the face is generally obscured; 
we see them moving through space, but are not granted a clear position from which to regard 
their reactions. Second, the roving hallway sequences are largely shot in shallow focus; the mise-
                                            
110 Elephant marks Van Sant’s first use of this technique, one which he returns to in his two subsequent films Last 
Days and Paranoid Park. 
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en-scène of the halls is recognizable but not whole, much like a sketch (see fig. 14). This serves 
to make generic the school: it is once a specific place yet this specificity is withheld in favor of a 
vague sense of the spatial boundaries and the characters within them. Finally, and in contrast to 
the last point, on the occasions when the camera does depart from the school building, exteriors 
are shot in deep focus. This variation in visible depth of field is schematic, for, ironically, the 
spectator gains no greater insight to the shootings than would one who looks upon the school 
from behind police tape or on CNN: in other words, the space inside the school building, soon 
home to such unthinkable carnage, cannot be fully seen or comprehended. However, from the 
outside, the appearance of the world is more complete. The interior of the high school is 
therefore only partially available to us.  
 
Figure 12. Nathan (Nathan Tyson) and Carrie (Carrie Finklea) in one of several behind-the-back 
tracking shot loops in Elephant. Note the extremely shallow focus, which contributes to the 
mystery of the high school interior.111 
 
                                            
111 This image from Elephant is a digital frame capture by the author. Elephant. DVD. Directed by Gus Van Sant. 
2003; New York: HBO Home Video, 2004. 
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 Just as Van Sant subverts our expectation that the ever-reliable realist convention of the 
long-take will provide to us the “truth,” so too does he play off our awareness of Columbine by 
offering up characters who may be able to prevent the attacks that we know are imminent, 
characters who might re-write history through their interventions. One such character is Benny 
(Bennie Dixon), whose tracking shot loop is withheld until after the gunfire begins and who was 
previously only seen at the edges of the frame during a touch football game at the film’s opening. 
When Van Sant finally follows Benny, he is “swimming upstream,” moving towards the sound 
of the shots while other students run past him for the exits. He appears unfazed, unrushed, even 
curious, as he calmly enters a classroom and helps a female student exit a window. Singling 
Benny out from the other characters by both his late arrival and his race (African-American, 
whereas the other members of the ensemble are all white), Van Sant seems to tempt us to hope 
for his counter-strike. However, he, too, is unceremoniously shot and killed, no face-to-face 
confrontation with his killer ever permitted.   
 Even more conspicuous is the case of John, who witnesses the killers enter the school 
building and is therefore the most equipped to prevent or mitigate the carnage by calling for help. 
Van Sant introduces John in such a way that one might reasonably assume him to be a 
conventional movie hero. We first see him negotiate the wheel away from his drunken father as 
their car careens and pinballs off parked vehicles. Moreoever, unlike the film’s other characters, 
John is given a considerable amount more exposition: we come to know his struggles with his 
father’s alcoholism, his relationship with girlfriend, his seeming cross-clique popularity. John 
comes across as concerned, responsible, selfless. Furthermore, he is granted both the greatest 
amount of screen time and degree of mobility in and around the school. Again, we first see John 
off the school grounds, next outside the building, and then, camera lingering after, walking the 
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hallways, before he exits once more. It is while outside the building that John is forewarned of 
the upcoming attacks. Alex and Eric, entering the building in camouflage fatigues with duffel 
bags of weapons, explicitly tell him “Get the fuck out of here and don’t come back. Some heavy 
shit’s going down.”  
John, despite possessing specific knowledge of the impending attacks, behaves not as the 
classical hero he is coded to be. Instead his inaction echoes the lack of volition that Deleuze, 
some twenty years prior, marked as the defining characteristic of the modern protagonist, a 
protagonist born in post-war Italy. With unsettling ineffectuality, John initiates an exterior loop, 
circling the perimeter of the school building in an attempt to dissuade others from entering. But 
note the vagueness of his warnings: he pleads with his fellow students and teachers to not enter 
the building—ever polite (“excuse me sir, don’t go in there, please!”)—, but he never explains 
why, never identifies with any specificity the threat within. Rather, when asked the question, he 
simply reiterates his initial directive: “Just don’t go in there, please.” John does not call for help, 
does not pull the fire alarm, does not convey the urgency of the knowledge he possesses and 
meekly attempts to share.  Granted the type of concrete visual evidence of the impending attacks 
that the actual Columbine students and faculty apparently did not have, John cannot muster any 
adequate counter. His failure, though, cannot be construed as one of agency; rather, his 
deficiency is at the level of language, the deployment of the appropriate signifier of imminent 
danger. Like the inarticulate characters of Mumblecore, John is afflicted with a communicative 
chasm that he cannot overcome, a floundering of language. Words fail. 
 I wish, then, to frame Elephant around the central problem of language. Teachers speak 
over and around the students, never overcoming the gap in the sender-receiver model. The 
students, likewise, speak but exchange nothing in the process. Surely it cannot be arbitrary that 
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our two teenage madmen designate the school’s language lab as their base of operations during 
their attacks, since school administration and students “don’t use it anymore.” How fitting then 
that, amidst a futility of language, words literally become background noise. As Eric and Alex 
wander the halls of their high school picking off students one-by-one, we hear something of a 
droning hum. Listen closer: this escalating buzz, a musique concrète, is a collage of recorded 
voices stacked upon one another until the words become indiscernible and their meanings lost. It 
is but a cacophony–sound, fury, signifying nothing. 
BEYOND IMAGES AND NARRATION: FREE INDIRECT SOUND 
Elephant, visually lush and stylishly shot, features a remarkably rich sound design, 
something of a signature of its auteur. The voices of the students, for instance, reverberate 
differently against the walls of the various spaces of the school: in the locker room, muffled 
voices carry over the tops of lockers; in the hallways, voices ping-pong off the dense walls. 
While these sounds help contribute a certain verisimilitude to the film—a sonic realism—it is the 
moments in which Van Sant breaks the unity of sound and image that are most intriguing. 
 The opening moments of Elephant cue us immediately that sound and image will not 
necessarily be tethered. The film begins with a low-angle shot of a power line. The clouds float 
across the screen, right to left, at what appears an impossible speed before slowing down to a 
more appropriate rate, only to ramp up once again. Gradually, the daytime light fades, turns blue, 
then black. A street lamp flickers on. A time-lapse establishing shot such as this is by no means a 
new device; however, what Van Sant chooses to accompany it is: we hear what sounds like 
children playing– laughter, the trampling feet of an athletic contest of some sort, the faint 
clapping hands of cheerleaders. Voices, though largely indistinct, are audible: they proceed at a 
“normal” rate. Thus, while the soundtrack saunters in real time, the image sprints. 
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 This appears to be the inauguration within Van Sant’s oeuvre of a technique he will come 
to use more frequently in Paranoid Park. This granting of autonomy to the soundtrack allows it 
to break the customary marriage of sound and image. Thus, as Deleuze would describe it, we 
have at once two images: the visual- and the sound-image. This is not to say, however, that in 
Elephant the audio and the visual are unrelated. On the contrary, they are closely affiliated. What 
is most unusual is that the sound predicts or calls forth the visual, inverting the teleological 
conception of sound as secondary to the visual. Van Sant deploys the aural component of film in 
a similar fashion as does Joe Swanberg in Kissing on the Mouth, only here the sounds do not 
simply run autonomously and concurrently with the visual. Rather, sounds take the lead.  
 Another example: over the early phys-ed scene, we hear the strains of Beethoven. At 
first, this appears a curious choice. Clearly, 18th century classical music does not “fit” a present-
day high school and seems at first blush an aural counterpoint, an ironic anachronism that breaks 
the customary “teenpic” soundtrack. Jameson would no doubt call this “that pure and random 
play of signifiers that we call postmodernism.”112 He would be partly right: Van Sant’s 
intertextuality is marked by a degree of playfulness, but the use of Beethoven here is neither 
random nor simply nostalgic. Rather, the eventual killer Alex is aligned later in the film with 
Beethoven. Van Sant inverts one of the theses that journalistic discourse and pop psychology 
supplied for the “cause” of the Columbine attacks: instead of heavy metal and Marilyn Manson, 
Alex prefers Beethoven, and, in one scene, practices “Moonlight Sonata” on the piano in his 
living room.113 Thus, I contend when we hear Beethoven throughout the film, Van Sant is 
“speaking” as Alex would. He is, in short, engaging in a free indirect relationship with the 
                                            
112 Jameson, Postmodernism, 96. 
113 Manson, the heavy metal musician who, in his hubristic showmanship, calls himself the antichrist, was frequently 
cited as a catalyst for Klebold and Harris. This assertion is humorously dissected and dismissed in Michael Moore’s 
interview with Manson in Bowling for Columbine (2002), released one year prior to Elephant.  
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character. We can see, then, that the emergence of “Moonlight” over the opening credit sequence 
is a harbinger of the attacks, one that (retrospectively, upon subsequent viewings) suffuses the 
film with a sense of impending doom, even more so when juxtaposed against the faint giggles 
and cheers. Beethoven’s (and, by extension, Alex’s) piece is heard even before the shooter is 
ever seen, echoing the child murderer’s whistle in Lang’s M (1931) which announces his 
looming presence before the visual image confirms it, only in this instance the lag time between 
sound and image is far greater.   
It may be said then that Van Sant’s use of sound in Elephant is not simply contrapuntal, 
but that it complicates sound at the level of its enunciation. As we’ve seen, Alex’s bloody 
peregrinations throughout the high school are, in a manner of speaking, “scored” by the character 
(or as the character might have scored a film of his exploits). Thus, Van Sant, having entered into 
a free indirect mimesis with Alex, pulls the strains of the German master from its earlier context 
and applies it to the film’s opening and its climax. And yet there remains another level of 
friction, not simply between sound and image but between and among the multiple sounds within 
the same scenes. Take, for instance, the moment when Alex, stalking the corridors, quotes 
Macbeth (“so foul and fair a day I have not seen”) while accompanied by “Moonlight”: an atonal 
ring is faintly heard, one that accretes, grows louder, announces itself to be the squealing 
feedback of an electric guitar. We have two sets of music, one (Beethoven) that floats between 
diegetic and non-diegetic, and another that is quite obviously sourced outside the fictional world 
of the film. Alex’s score rubs against Van Sant’s, both competing for a sort of enunciative 
eminence.  
In the opening of this chapter, I characterized Van Sant’s modus operandi as one of 
distance, both physical (i.e., between lens and subject) and emotional (i.e., avoiding character 
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interiority). And yet here, in the middle of his tripartite rumination on death, he provides us 
momentarily glimpses into one of his most opaque characters. In so doing, Van Sant breaks 
briefly from a more traditional realist strategy of “objectivity” and invests in an intersubjective 
space (that is, between himself and his character) as well as an intrasubjective realm (that is, an 
interiority, within the character). We might conceive of the death trilogy as, following his foray 
into commercial Hollywood, a late-career return to the art film, one specifically buttressed by a 
concomitant revisiting of a realist aesthetic that was apparent from his first feature, Mala Noche. 
It is as if these three films (Gerry, Elephant, and Last Days) explore the “problem” or “limits” of 
realism, much as Rosellini and Fellini did at the waning moments of the neorealist period. But 
the use of the free indirect mode, what Pasolini called the “poetic” mode, that surfaces ever so 
briefly in Elephant is placed front-and-center in Paranoid Park, Van Sant’s first feature film 
following the trilogy. Whereas the quintessential shot in the trilogy was wide and in-depth, 
Paranoid Park’s is tight, shallow. Instead of leaving the viewer to speculate on the interior states 
of his characters, Van Sant allows the protagonist to speak in voice-over, as did the liquor store 
clerk Walt in Mala Noche. Rather than follow his young male characters through the any-space-
whatevers—a desert (Gerry), a high school (Elephant), a castle (Last Days)—Van Sant focuses 
his attention on an altogether different space: his character’s subjectivity.  
“THE BOUNDARIES OF REALISM” AND “THE OTHER SIDE” 
 
[With Fellini] we reach the boundaries of realism . . . [though he] drives on further still, takes us 
beyond them. It is a little as if, having been led to this degree of interest in appearances, we are 
now to see the characters not among the objects but, as if these had becomes transparent, through 
them. I mean by this that without our noticing the world has moved from meaning to analogy, 
then from analogy to the supernatural.”114 – André Bazin 
 
  Much like the recording session scene in Last Days, there is a moment in Paranoid Park 
whose centrality to the film cannot be overstated, a moment that establishes the film’s motifs, its 
                                            
114 Bazin, What is Cinema? 2:88; emphasis in original 
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stakes, its style. Alex (Gabe Nevins), a sixteen-year-old boy, enters the empty house of his best 
friend. He tosses his clothing into a garbage bag, crawls across the floor so that no one may see 
him through the living room window, and heads towards the bathroom. He strips and enters the 
shower. The water cascades down his face, which we see in slow motion. The sound of the 
water, however, carries on in “real time,” irrespective of the accompanying visuals. Alex acts out 
the movie cliché of the cleansing shower that removes not just the dirt from the skin but internal 
guilt as well. Yet Alex does not emerge “clean,” for his actions (which have yet to be fully 
disclosed by this point within the film’s fractured chronology) continue to haunt him. This scene 
does, however, reinscribe the relationship between sound and image hinted at in Elephant though 
pushed now into another direction. While this approach tells us a great deal about Alex, it 
equally illuminates Van Sant. Many of the aesthetic preoccupations and thematic tendencies that 
have emerged over the course of Van Sant’s career coalesce in this film, fuse in a film dominated 
by the time-image. Recall, for the sake of comparison, Deleuze’s comment on Shirley Clarke: 
“The film she wanted to make about herself became the film she made about Jason.” This is the 
case, I argue, with Van Sant and Paranoid Park: as much as the film is obviously “about” Alex, 
it is just as much about Van Sant. 
 I shall return to the shower scene momentarily. First, some necessary plot summary: 
Alex, a meek and disaffected teenager who suffers under a hen-pecking girlfriend and recently-
separated, feuding parents, finds refuge at a dingy skateboard park located under an overpass in 
Van Sant’s hometown of Portland, Oregon. He is but a novice skateboarder, but the allure of the 
older kids from the wrong side of the tracks proves too much to resist. He befriends one older 
man named Scratch who offers to teach Alex how to jump freight trains. While doing so, they 
are chased by a security guard whom Alex swings at with his skateboard. The guard falls 
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backwards onto the opposite track and is severed in two by an oncoming train. Here, as in 
Elephant, tragedy occurs, though in this instance, Van Sant offers a glimmer of hope that the 
traumatic events that take place might be overcome, that the indescribable might be mastered or 
somewhat contained by words. 
 Van Sant opens on the image of the St. John Bridge in Portland in much the same manner 
as he began Elephant. In time-lapse, cars rush over the Willamette River. We hear, though, not 
vehicles, but Nino Rota’s theme from Juliet of the Spirits (Fellini, 1965). Rota is deployed on 
several occasions throughout the film as Van Sant mines Fellini for a thematic mirror to his 
coming-of-age tale. Rota is not the only bit of the cinematic past that Van Sant borrows. In fact, 
he appropriates most heavily from his own body of work. For instance, over Paranoid Park’s 
final scene, we hear Elliott Smith’s song “Angeles,” which, not coincidentally, concludes Van 
Sant’s own Good Will Hunting. Furthermore, Alex, our protagonist, obviously shares the same 
name as one of the gunmen in Elephant.  
 Alex’s story and Van Sant’s autobiography coincide most prominently in the previously 
mentioned shower scene. The allusions are numerous, both visual and aural. Van Sant 
infamously remade Hitchcock’s Psycho, and he apes the look of both versions in Paranoid Park 
by playing off Alex’s long, wet locks, which, much like Janet Leigh’s in the original incarnation, 
adhere to his face as he slides down the wall of the shower. Furthermore, the musical 
accompaniment sounds at first like ambient noise, though it is in actuality Frances White’s 
“Walking Through ‘Resonant Landscape’ No. 2”, a song that was also featured in Elephant. This 
unique bit of self-referentiality is complicated further by a free indirect oscillation between the 
visual-image and the sound-image. Van Sant shoots Alex in profile and close-up as White’s 
ambient song wells up. The at-first low hum builds to a frenzy—no pun intended—in which we 
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hear birds chirping. Van Sant then cuts to Alex against the shower wall, where the wallpaper (a 
print featuring birds) is framed prominently. It is as if the soundtrack, which I have described as 
being “ahead” of the visuals, calls forth the birds that appear in the film’s mise-en-scène. And the 
use of the bird is hardly arbitrary, for it, too, refers back to another of Hitchcock’s films, The 
Birds (1963). Thus, one signifier (“bird”) signifies a film, a song, a film that featured the song, 
and another film by Van Sant who once remade a film by the maker of The Birds, all of which is 
embedded in an overt reference to Psycho (see fig. 13). 
 Alex’s position as narrator of the film, though, destabilizes our ability to attribute the 
source of a particular sound or visual element by blending four enunciative positions: 1) Alex as 
protagonist of the film, or the “objective” depiction of him; 2) Alex as writer/narrator, whose 
avoidance of confronting his role in the security guard’s death motivates the non-linear structure  
 
Figure 13. Director Gus Van Sant references his and Hitchcock’s versions of Psycho, The Birds, 
and his own Elephant. Gabe Nevins as Alex/Janet Leigh.115 
                                            
115 This and subsequent images from Paranoid Park are digital frame captures by the author. Paranoid Park. DVD. 
Directed by Gus Van Sant. 2007; New York: IFC Films, 2008. 
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and the multiple ellipses throughout the film; 3) Alex as suspect, who, while being questioned by 
Detective Lu (Daniel Liu), contradicts the information we attain from 1 and 2 above; and 4) Van 
Sant, the director. Being that the narrative is constructed as a recollection, it becomes at times 
impossible to discern from which position a specific element emerges. For instance, in one 
unusual sequence, Alex sits on a bench near the beach, writing his confession in his journal, 
where his words are heard in voiceover. He first describes his fascination with the titular skate 
park upon his first solo visit (“I could’ve sat there all night”) over the image of him perched at 
the top of a half-pipe. During this shot, the sound of skateboard wheels on concrete is introduced, 
which blankets the scene in white noise. Alex then begins to recount the troubles of his recent 
home life in light of his parents’ separation accompanied by an image of Alex at the dinner table 
with his younger brother; all the while the rumble of the wheels continues. Very faintly, an 
acousmatic voice (male, older) shouts “hey, kid.” Next shot: Alex back at the park, peering out at 
the skaters as his voiceover continues. We then cut back to the ostensible present (the beach), the 
place and time of the narrational utterance. The rush of the waves in the distance blends with the 
skateboard drone and forms a blended layer underneath the voiceover. As Alex writes, we twice 
again hear “hey, kid.” On each occasion, Alex lifts his eyes from his notebook as if hearing this 
call. In fact, on the final yell, he turns his eyes, searching, to the upper-right corner of the frame 
(see fig. 14). Off this glance, we cut back to the skate park, where this unseen, unknown voice 
de-acoustamatizes: Scratch, the older skater who is later with Alex during the security guard’s 
accident, approaches the teenager after calling for his attention. 
 We of course have come to expect brisk shifts in time and space in films with non-linear 
chronology. What is most disconcerting though in Paranoid Park is the bleeding over of the 
sound elements. The rumble of skateboard wheels (from the already past event) combine 
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seamlessly with the ocean waves of the film’s supposed present. And further, Alex, recounting 
his first encounter with Scratch, hears his voice in a space and time in which Scratch is most 
obviously absent. This aligns with Deleuze’s serial formation of time, a non-successional 
arrangement in which past, present, and future coexist and open the possibility of becoming. In 
this sequence, Scratch’s voice is not a simple recollection or narrative description. Rather, this 
past event exists in simultaneity with the diegetic present of the film, so much in fact that Alex 
hears what is ultimately an incompossibility.   
 
Figure 14. The past contaminates the present as Alex (Gabe Nevins) is distracted from his 
writing by the absent skater Scratch shouting “hey, kid!” 
 
 In this sequence, a scant 45 seconds, we experience a fundamentally different sense of 
time, image, and sound than that of Elephant. Van Sant’s Columbine film is organized around 
the repetition of movement; Paranoid Park is governed by the pure image of time. Most crucial 
to my purposes, the moments that most reveal the time-image in this film are often the ones most 
readily dismissed as mere postmodern playfulness. 
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 Analogously, Van Sant’s freewheeling deployment of music and sound might be viewed 
as ironic commentary or simple intertextuality. Yet, the free indirect of the time-image especially 
problematizes even cut-and-dry formalist theories of sound. We have become conditioned to 
view the non-diegetic elements of the cinema as “outside” the film, “excessive.” Though the 
non-diegetic is certainly a manipulation on the part of the filmmaker, it cannot be so easily 
dismissed as contingent or mere external element. Take, for instance, a sequence in Paranoid 
Park in which Alex is seen driving his mother’s car. As the sequence begins, Alex is seen 
bobbing his head to a hip-hop song that is apparently emanating from the car’s stereo system. 
Alex’s movements coincide with the rhythm of the track, suggesting that he is hearing what we, 
the audience, hear. In keeping with some cinematic conventions, this audio is especially present; 
that is to say, it does not suggest the proximity of the source in relation to the camera position but 
instead emits “through” the image. Yet Van Sant jump cuts from Alex’s synchronized bouncing 
to a shot of him sitting behind the wheel, pale, as Beethoven—who, as we recall, was central in 
Elephant as well—is heard at the same volume and apparent proximity as the previous song. 
Nothing in the film suggests that Alex would indeed listen to such music, so the conjunction of it 
with the image breaks the assumption of a diegetic source previously held. Alex appears dazed, 
nervous, in shock even. Could the abrupt shift from the buoyant hip-hop song to a more forlorn 
section of Beethoven’s Ninth signify that the latter is taking place after the security guard’s 
death? Perhaps. What is certain, though, is that this choice is not deployed arbitrarily or as 
simply extra-diegetic commentary on the part of Van Sant. Take the subsequent jarring cut as 
evidence: off his stunned countenance, we next see Alex ordering a hamburger from a drive-thru 
window (which deviates considerably from the sequence of events he describes to Detective Lu 
where he claims to have visited a sandwich shop) followed by him once again driving. This 
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image is accompanied by a somber country and western song that features the refrain “there’s a 
time to run, a time to stand / I can’t beat him, I’ll die like a man.” Here, Van Sant speaks from 
two enunciative positions over the course of three shots: the unlikely symphony is most likely 
the director’s ironic remark (“Ode to Joy” associated with the guard’s death), while the fatalistic 
country ballad is equivalent to Van Sant supplying a song that reflects not his own commentary 
on the event but rather one that “speaks” in terms that Alex might himself use (“die like a man”). 
Alex suffers from the same inarticulateness that plagues the characters of Mumblecore, so he 
would thus see his contribution to the death of an innocent man in the black-and-white, 
irrevocable terms of the classical western. In other words, in his interpretation of the events, Alex 
does not consider his role in the guard’s death as an accident or as self-defense. Rather, he views 
it in terms of moral absolutes: Alex dons the black cowboy hat to the guard’s (sheriff’s) white. 
 As I posited above, Paranoid Park features four enunciative positions, four sources to 
which we can attribute the cinematic information or visual-aural utterance. The sequence in the 
car, however, does not contain what we may call Alex’s direct address, his voiceover that would 
ground the sounds and images we see. Instead, we are within the domain of the indirect, which, 
of course, contributes to the complexity of this short minute-and-a-half sequence. Six shots, three 
musical passages, and an oscillation of enunciation wedged somewhere in between the film’s 
author and his character.   
 By entering into a free indirect relationship with his character and providing for Alex 
something of a late-film redemptive moment, Van Sant appears to have overcome the 
encumbrances of his realist aesthetic.116 Remembering that Van Sant began his career in a realist 
mode (Mala Noche) and then returned to it with his fatalistic death trilogy, one can see in 
Paranoid Park its director coming to terms with his own aesthetic tendencies of distantiation 
                                            
116 The complexion and consequences of this redemption I will address in the following section. 
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from his characters. Locked into the confines of an “objective” approach, which Bazin in this 
section’s epigraph characterized as the “boundaries of realism,” Van Sant seems to circle his 
characters with his probing camera, unable to arrive at any understanding or illumination of the 
men who so intrigue and baffle both the director and his viewers. Yet with Paranoid Park, Van 
Sant, by delving further into a peculiar aural-visual interplay that he experimented with briefly in 
Elephant, arrives at a place similar to the one Bazin described Fellini having landed—on the 
“other side of things.”117 Like Fellini, Van Sant overcomes the “boundaries of realism.”118 This 
surmounting of the barriers of realism is only possible through the free indirect mode—which is 
unlike, however, the “delirious aestheticism” of Antonioni that is enacted visually through the 
characters’ relationship to the setting.119 Van Sant’s intersubjective interaction with Alex is most 
profoundly actualized through the director’s use of sound and music, which highlights for us 
both the benefits of the study of film sound as well as the doors that are opened by Deleuze’s re-
thinking of the supposedly “settled” issue of filmic realism. 
BEARING WITNESS 
 In addition to their director, formal similarities, and milieu, there is another unifying 
factor between Elephant and Paranoid Park: the role of the witness and the problem of the first-
hand account. Both films prominently feature characters who in the midst of a crisis are 
compelled to document, archive, or otherwise make sense of the senseless events that transpire 
around them. Indeed, we can see such a character emerge in a number of guises in all the films 
that have been considered in this study. Nasia, in George Washington, cannot fathom the death 
of her friend and her playmates involvement in it, so she tells her story in voiceover, crafting a 
fiction that fills in the gaps of her knowledge. In Swanberg’s Kissing on the Mouth, an 
                                            
117 Bazin, What is Cinema?, 2:88. 
118 Ibid. 
119 Schwartz, “Typewriter,” 126. 
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interviewer seeks to answer the riddle of love by collecting oral testimonies from friends. With 
Four Eyed Monsters, the detritus of the couple’s actual conversations scrawled on notepads are 
collected and collaged into the story of their odd love affair. It becomes apparent, too, that in the 
case of the Mumblecore films, these collectors are both characters and directors, with Swanberg, 
Buice, and Crumley all playing either themselves or very close approximations within their own 
movies. Though Van Sant does not act in his films, we can certainly “see” him in them, as he 
often places a surrogate for himself into the narrative, one who is compelled to document, to 
gather, to compile, to narrate, to write.  
 Staiger explains that minority authors often create an “alter ego” within their films. Van 
Sant is a problematic case, for, though openly gay, he resists the moniker and has in interviews 
aligned himself not with his queer characters but instead the straight, white, middle class 
individuals who populate his texts, as their background is more consistent with his upbringing. 
Staiger suggests, however, that Van Sant “has mostly posed himself as a voyeur to alien cultures 
he finds intriguing to watch.”120 Obviously, associating a character with an author’s personality 
is fraught with the problems of auteurist criticism. Nonetheless, the two films in question here 
provide characters who play roles similar to Van Sant’s as director, which provides a productive 
position from which to consider many of the larger problems that this study has sought to 
address.  
 I wish to consider first the character of Elias in Elephant. At the most obvious level, 
Elias, the photographer, functions much as Van Sant does, for they both are creators of images. 
Consider: Elias is first seen wandering the park near the high school and approaches two 
strangers to pose for him. He instructs them how to stand, how to move, what emotion to convey 
                                            
120 Staiger, “Authorship Studies,” 10. It bears noting that, despite having been published after the theatrical release 
of two-thirds of the death trilogy, Staiger halts her analysis with Finding Forrester and primarily focuses, as so 
much of the scholarship on Van Sant does, on My Own Private Idaho.  
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(“be a little happier”): like Van Sant, Elias approaches amateur “real” subjects and directs their 
performances. Secondly, Elias, exceeded in this regard only by John, is afforded a freedom to 
move within various social cliques throughout the school. He easily wins the cooperation of the 
“punky” kids outside the school and interacts easily with the similarly mobile John. This mirrors 
Van Sant’s remarkable capacity to navigate within the art house and commercial realms of 
American cinema and his being equally at home casting in shopping malls and skate parks. The 
most obvious similarity, though, is that both Van Sant and his character wield a camera.  
 My choice of the word wield here is not an incidental one. In a film so saturated with 
weaponry as is Elephant, it must be noted the interchangeability of the jargon of firearms and 
that of the photograph (and, by extension, the cinema): one “loads” the camera (often with a 
“magazine”), “points,” “aims,” and “shoots.”121 This relationship between the camera and the 
gun are made more explicit late in the film. In one of the iterations of the tragic events of the 
film, Eric and Alex are seen entering the library, where Alex takes aim at someone offscreen. He 
loads the chamber and begins to the squeeze the trigger. Instead of a gunshot, though, we cut to 
an earlier time and altogether different space—Eric entering a shower to join Alex for a tentative 
sexual encounter (“I’ve never kissed anyone before, have you?”) prior to the morning of the 
attacks. The anticipated noise of the gunfire is replaced by the benign “click” of the door latch in 
a sound bridge that momentarily moves ahead of the visual. This moment in the library, though, 
is later repeated, but this time we see Alex’s target. As Alex loads the gun, we cut to a shot of 
Elias, who does not run in fear, but instead lifts the camera around his neck and places his eye to 
the viewfinder, framed to break the fourth wall and implicate the viewer in the ensuing act of 
violence. The “click” we heard previously was not actually “attached” to the shower door, as the 
                                            
121 We might connect this terminology to the earliest moving image cameras. I’m thinking here specifically of 
Étienne-Jules Marey’s primitive camera that was modeled after a rifle, complete with barrel, trigger, and stock. 
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visuals would lead us to believe, but rather the shutter of his camera. Elias’ morbid curiosity 
trumps his instincts of self-preservation and as a result he becomes the very first victim of the 
massacre (see figs. 15 and 16). 
 This shower scene proves an illuminating contrast to the one already discussed in 
Paranoid Park. In Elephant, the camera maintains its position from outside the doorway: we 
hear the conversation between the two boys, but the kiss remains unseen, obscured by the 
pebbled glass of the stall door. Therefore, in the Columbine film, Van Sant’s fractured 
chronology equates three distinct events: the unseen kiss in the shower, Elias’ desire to see (i.e., 
record or document), and Elias death at the hands of one of the boys from the shower. Thus, the 
character whom we can align with the director is the first one to die, his desire to witness 
mapping onto Van Sant’s desire to see into the shower. That the centerpiece scene of Paranoid 
Park is in tight close-up of Alex from the other side of the shower curtain again marks Van 
Sant’s shift in approach between the two films, for, in the latter text, he allows himself to see, as 
it were, into the shower. In other words, the Alex of Elephant remains hidden while the Alex of 
Paranoid Park is fully visible. 
 We may also discern quite a bit of Van Sant and the idea of surrogacy by evaluating how 
he “treats” certain characters within his body of work. Van Sant often fashions himself as a 
tourist, one not indigenous to the foreign culture that his camera analyzes. Van Sant is frank in 
his own self-appraisal: “I’m hanging out on the streets, trying to get to know this clandestine 
scene, but I’m really just a Waspy white kid who has no business there.”122 For each of the alien 
scenes, there exists a character—generally young, scruffy, and male—who garners the lion’s 
share of Van Sant’s empathy. In To Die For [1995], one could argue it is Jimmy (Joaquin  
                                            
122 Quoted in Staiger, “Authorship Studies, 9. 
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Phoenix), in My Own Private Idaho, it is Scott (Keanu Reeves).123 In fact, Van Sant likens his  
 
 
Figure15. Shot: The sound of the offscreen shotgun being cocked cues us that Alex (Alex Frost) 
has taken aim at Elias in Elephant.  
 
 
Figure 16. Reverse Shot: Elias (Elias McConnell) “aims” and “shoots” back. 
 
                                            
123 Ibid. 
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late career technique as resembling that of Pasolini, what with his focus on non-professional, gay 
street kids as his subject.124 
 Van Sant displays a greater empathy for Alex in Paranoid Park than perhaps any other 
character in the latter half of his career. As discussed above, Van Sant avoids much of the  
distance with Alex that so characterizes his attitude towards characters in the series of films that 
preceded it. But how much of Van Sant has made its way into the film? Amy Taubin reads 
Paranoid Park’s train scene as a homosexual initiation, an interpretation she poses to Van Sant 
in an interview; the director neither confirms nor denies. So what if the traumatic incident at the 
train tracks—so obscured by ellipses, lyricism, and the free indirect—was not only the accident 
but also the awakening of Alex’s desire?  
 In my analysis of the “hey, kid” sequence, I noted how Alex seems to hear Scratch’s 
voice and even responds to it as he writes his confession. Note also how Scratch’s calls interrupt 
the portion of Alex’s narration where he is remarking on his pushy girlfriend Jennifer (Taylor 
Momsen). As he recollects the events of the accident, Scratch, imbued at that moment with the 
stirring power of the acousmêtre, tears Alex’s thoughts away from Jennifer and returns them 
wholly to him. Watch also how Van Sant shoots the introduction of Alex and Scratch: Scratch 
asks Alex if he can ride his skateboard as two of his friends fall in behind him. Scratch invites 
Alex to go with him to “ride a train and get some beer.” In the subsequent shot, Van Sant pans in 
slow motion from right to left from a close-up of Alex, past the two other new arrivals in very 
soft focus, to Scratch in close-up, smiling. In terms of lighting, framing, and editing, Scratch is 
by no means a minor character. However, in Alex’s narration, he is never mentioned by name or 
description at all, and is only seen twice, each time briefly.  
                                            
124 Gus Van Sant, “Roll Forever,” interview with Amy Taubin. Sight & Sound, August 2007. 
91 
 
 In his journal/narration, Alex is evasive and intentionally avoids the incident at the train 
yard. However, late in the film, he reveals what to that point had only been insinuated (“I had 
tried to put this part out of my mind…”). As he picks up the story of his time with Scratch, Alex 
jumps from the park to the tracks, eliminating anything that may have occurred during the walk 
over. This ellipsis, coupled with Alex’s sex scene with Jennifer (which occurs chronologically 
after the security guard’s death but prior to its depiction within the narrative), suggests that one 
event is more privileged in Alex’s mind. 
 Throughout the film, Jennifer nags Alex to purchase condoms so that may sleep together 
in what ostensibly would be each their first time. When that moment arrives, Jennifer, in a 
wordless exchange, grabs Alex’s hand at a party and leads him upstairs, camera following behind 
in a shot eerily reminiscent of those in Elephant. Van Sant shoots the ensuing love scene with no 
direct audio, in slow motion and tight close-up of either Alex’s or Jennifer’s face, though her 
long blonde locks obscure both. Throughout, Alex is disinterested, bored even. Afterward, 
Jennifer immediately retires to the bathroom to call her friends to inform them of how amazing 
her first time was, as Alex remains motionless on the bed, as passive now as he was during their 
lovemaking moments earlier. Has there ever been another male-female sex scene in which the 
teenage male was as disinterested? 
 The contrast could not be more stark: the alluring skate park and the dangerous Scratch 
preoccupies Alex, far more so than his popular, petite, blonde, sexually-eager, cheerleader 
girlfriend, who in any other film concerning the coming of age of an adolescent male would 
undoubtedly be adored. Here, she is reviled, broken up with in unceremonious fashion under the 
football field bleachers as Van Sant drowns out her protests with the music of Nino Rota.   
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 Recall, again, Deleuze on Shirley Clarke’s Portrait of Jason: “the film she wanted to 
make about herself is the film she made about Jason.” Can we not make a similar, albeit 
speculative, statement about Gus Van Sant in relation to Alex? Van Sant, who admits to being 
fascinated by the marginal punk boys of society, invests himself in a character who likewise 
finds the danger and freedom of the Portland subculture alluring. Alex looks on at the young men 
of Paranoid Park much as Van Sant does—with fascination, with attraction. 
 A figure who has already factored prominently in this study who shares a similar 
preoccupation with alluring, marginal boys is Pasolini, who, coincidentally, hosted Van Sant and 
other students during his filming of Salò, or the 120 Days of Sodom (1975).125 Van Sant 
acknowledges their similarities in terms of subject matter (captivating street kids, frequently non-
actors, often gay), but, most interestingly, he regards his late career as a turn towards Pasolini 
with regard to his approach—“working backwards,” in Van Sant’s description.126 So if we might 
isolate Van Sant’s homoerotics as a central thread that runs throughout his work, what is the 
“change” that is associated with this late embracing of Pasolini beyond mere subject matter? 
Angelo Restivo, in pinpointing Accattone (1961) as the prototype for what he dubs the 
“international youth film”,127 posits that the centrality of repressed homosexuality (for Pasolini’s 
characters and others within the genre) is paradoxically an assurance that they are “doomed by 
the social order and yet at the same time filled with ‘unknown possibility.’”128 In other words, 
the suffocating realities of their impoverished lives are mitigated by the very (slight) chance that 
                                            
125 Gus Van Sant, Interview with Scott Tobias, The AV Club, 5 March 2007. http://www.avclub.com/articles/gus-
van-sant,13800/  
126 Gus Van Sant, “Roll Forever” 
127Restivo locates this genre within nations undergoing modernization, so, clearly, it does not map cleanly onto a late 
capitalist text such as Paranoid Park. That being said, one of the defining characteristics of the international youth 
film is a “pedagogic” function, a “documentary” impulse, that, I think, can be similarly located within the work of 
Van Sant, whose neorealist techniques and focus on wayward youth fit productively within Restivo’s formula. See 
Restivo, Cinema of Economic Miracles, 152-158. 
128 Ibid., 158. 
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within the homosexual encounter—either between the director and his characters or between the 
boys and the audience as an activation of a nostalgia—lies liberation, escape.  But within Van 
Sant’s death trilogy—a designation that suggests a fundamentally different attitude towards 
sexuality when compared with Pasolini’s own “trilogy of life”—homosexuality offers no hope of 
escape, no suggestion of a possibility other than death.129 In Gerry, the homoerotic tension 
between the two stranded men (Casey Affleck and Matt Damon) resolves itself in one’s 
murdering of the other. As we saw with Elephant, the two assailants share a kiss in the shower 
on the morning of the attacks: the possibility of overcoming their repressed desires, though, does 
not quell their greater lust for revenge. In Last Days, the androgynous Cobain character sees no 
option other than suicide. But with Paranoid Park, there exists, as a result of Alex’s largely 
unacknowledged attraction to Scratch, a way out of the caging demands of his girlfriend and the 
failed model of his parents’ marriage. By experiencing a dual initiation (first, into adulthood 
upon coming to terms with his role in the death of the guard, and second, from the tryst with the 
older skater punk), Alex arrives at a newly-found self-awareness, modest though it might be. In 
the death trilogy, each film results in the perishing of one or more of the films’ protagonists. In 
the film subsequent, death leads to an awakening. Thus, Van Sant, who on the surface was 
always operating within Pasolini’s terrain (the streets and the kids who populate them), arrives, 
by “working backwards,” not at certain doom or death, but rather a contradictory predicament of 
incarceration and freedom: we know that Alex’s skateboard, the “smoking gun” used to attack 
the guard, has been recovered by the police, and, therefore, his arrest is nearly certain. But his 
journaling that forms the voiceover amounts to a two-pronged confession, one of his role in the 
guard’s death and also as an admission of his same-sex encounter. Yet, in the film’s final image, 
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Alex, page-by-page, burns the testimonial pages from his notebook, retaining both of his secrets. 
One of these secrets is assuredly “out”; the other, however, is not. 
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CONCLUSION 
THE INVISIBLE THREAD 
“The evolution of film follows an invisible thread.”130—Andre Bazin 
“The visual image will thus never show us what the sound image utters.”131—Gilles Deleuze 
Amy Taubin, in her review of Paranoid Park, astutely locates the key paradox of the 
film, a paradox which I have argued runs throughout all the films that have been under 
discussion in this study. She first deems the film “an exceptionally delicate, refined, and 
affecting piece of neorealism,” one that manages simultaneously to “defy codes of film 
realism.”132 Her appraisal certainly resonates, as Van Sant adheres to many of the tenets of the 
post-war Italian films—shooting on location, casting real people as opposed to actors, narratives 
structured around elliptical fissures, etc. Of course, Van Sant also breaks with this prototype, for 
he concerns himself not so much with the material realities of poverty, nor is his aim the 
awakening of a class consciousness. Instead, Van Sant seems more intrigued by the blank, 
opaque face of a teenaged boy, the way that scruffy skateboarders defy gravity and linger briefly 
in the air like clouds, or how the eyes of youthful inexperience can transform the mundane space 
of a shopping mall into something altogether different, ethereal. In another shrewd observation, 
Taubin isolates precisely what are the larger stakes of Van Sant’s realism: “[T]he aesthetic 
problem that Van Sant is grappling with here is . . . how does the artist represent the exterior so 
that it speaks to the mystery of the interiority? And whose interiority—the artist’s or the 
subject’s?”133 This is the question that this study has pondered. 
                                            
130 Bazin, What is Cinema?, 2:90. 
131 Deleuze, Cinema 2, 279. 
132
 Amy Taubin, “Portrait of the Artist?” ArtForum 46 (2008): 107. 
133 Ibid. 
96 
 
As I recounted in the Chapter 1, there is a long tradition of thought on realism that 
envelops that which is often today considered outside its normal purview. For instance, we’ve 
seen that surrealism and its embracing of the irrational is fully imbricated with one of its root 
words: realism. This irrationality, this lack of any concrete object or characteristic to which we 
can point, is likewise fundamental to a number of other theoretical arenas. Bathes’ theorization, 
for one example, of the punctum, that element within a photograph that is outside of meaning and 
that touches or bodily affects us, is founded upon an unintended detail that nevertheless is 
harbored in the image, holding the potential to overwhelm the intention or narrative of the 
arranged elements. Similarly, Jean Epstein sought just such an affect in the face of the actor, one 
which was latent within the individual but only made manifest from its wresting from the world 
via the camera, its “caging” on celluloid, and its subsequent “liberation” when projected. And 
these two are but a slim sampling. Touching upon a smattering of thinkers, Paul Coughlin 
concisely lays out the overlapping philosophical and theoretical preoccupation with the 
concealed irrational that is suddenly made visible: 
Martin Heidegger labels it the moment of vision, Walter Benjamin the shock of 
sensation, Jean Epstein categorises it as photogénie, Paul Willeman suggests it is 
cinephilia and Walter Pater simply calls it the sublime moment. The it that each of these 
theorists is referring to is that indefinable moment in modern life or art when sensation 
consumes the spectator with an overwhelming and indescribably profound intensity. The 
overriding effect of this experience is the inability to verbalise or rationalise the 
encounter with any certitude. The sublime moment is individual, personal, and 
subjective, suggesting that it cannot be defined absolutely or resolved conclusively.134 
 
From this passage, we can imagine something of a Venn diagram that can accommodate such a 
group of disparate theorists and theories from an array of disciplines and across history. The 
mutual, irrational phenomenon that unites them all forms a core of hope or promise for the 
cinematic image to lay bear that which is mysterious and, ultimately, most crucial in the world. 
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 This core, this central concern, brings us to Bazin, cinema’s preeminent theorist of filmic 
realism. As we’ve seen, Bazin was widely rejected as naïve in the post-1968 political turn in film 
studies, for his insistence on a realist ontology of the cinema ran counter to the growing 
consensus that the medium was in fact defined by its illusionism. A closer look, though, reveals 
that the indexicality of the cinematic image was not for Bazin an end in and of itself, but a means 
to an encounter with the sublime and the irrational. This “mystic” Bazin deployed a number of 
vague terms to describe such encounters: “mystery,” the “supernatural,” “poetry,” “magic,” 
“surrealism.” Regardless of the label, it is clear to see that Bazin, late in his too-short life, had 
moved beyond objectivity and indexicality and into far different territory. 
 That Bazin never rigorously defined his terms opens up the discussion to someone who 
attempted such an elaboration on the irrational image—Deleuze. Though the philosopher is by 
no means a realist, he is, however, very much attuned to the simultaneity of the real and the 
virtual, the past and the present. Deleuze provides us in his taxonomy a perhaps more useful set 
of terms to address the problems that Bazin and others brought to the fore. Specifically, this 
study has made use of Deleuze’s conception of the interval or interstice, the irrational “gap” 
between two terms that the cinema may briefly cast us into.   
 I have relied here primarily on two such intervals: the actual-virtual and the subjective-
objective. Central to my project has been Deleuze’s elaboration on the notion of free indirect 
discourse, or a director’s “speaking” through his characters but in their specific dialects. The free 
indirect is key here, for it allows for the presence of what Deleuze called “falsifying narration,” 
or, perhaps more simply, the coexistence of mutually exclusive (“incompossible”) outcomes. 
Further, Deleuze seized upon the free indirect mode as one of the greatest powers of the cinema, 
for it involves a mutual “becoming” on the part of the filmmaker and his subject: the subject, 
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through a process of storytelling or “fabulation,” can call a people into being; However, this 
process must be necessarily aided by a filmmaker, one who “crosses over” to the other side of 
the camera to become one of his subjects. Thus, the free indirect mode puts the film (and its 
maker, its subjects) into an oscillation, one that serves to obliterate the distinction between 
subjective and objective, for though the two are distinct, they are, in the regime of the time-
image, indiscernible.  
 Each of the five films in this study has showcased some variation on the free indirect 
model as outlined by Deleuzed. The inclusion of deviations from the philosopher’s model is by 
design, for, much like Bazin, Deleuze sees the cinema as subject to a constant evolution or 
metamorphosis. To such an end, Deleuze asks in relation to the modern cinema: “What are the 
new forces at work in the image, and the new signs invading the screen?”135 If, as Deleuze 
persuasively argues, the post-war Italian cinema inaugurated a new kind of image, a modern 
image, then what types of images might we see subsequently in the postmodern? What mutations 
might they undergo? By looking at the contemporary cinema through Deleuze’s lens, we can 
attempt to plot these evolutions.  
 In order to do so, we first must consider the narrow spotlight I’ve used here. By focusing 
on contemporary American cinema, I’ve limited the discussion to cinemas that exist within a late 
capitalist framework. The reasons are numerous: first, by considering a realist cinema far 
removed from the Italian high-water mark, we engage with the question of the usefulness of that 
model as well as the continued inheritance of the neorealist moment. Secondly, whereas Deleuze 
was concerned with the modern cinema, I’ve looked exclusively at the postmodern. What better 
ground to consider the “new forces at work” than in a fully postmodern, late capitalist nation so 
defined by the inundation of images? Third, we have dealt with films decidedly within the art 
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house context that have emerged in the country that originated the worldwide dominant 
Hollywood model; thus, what do these marginal, minor cinemas have to say about this particular 
historical moment, this smaller than ten-year-window I’ve delimited? 
 Aside from the realist paradigm to which all of my examples are obviously indebted, the 
unifying element to this project has been Deleuze’s elaboration of a cinematic free indirect 
mode. We can therefore look back briefly at each of this study’s texts to see how the free 
indirect becomes the core innovation in this “new” realism I’ve focused upon. Secondly, through 
such a recap we can consider the host of other problems and questions that emerge from these 
texts, such as the role of the digital in the contemporary cinema, the complexities of authorship, 
and, most crucially, the use of sound, an area within the discipline that has experienced increased 
scholarly attention but which is nevertheless still inchoate. 
 With George Washington, we saw a peculiar free indirect relationship, one characterized 
by the addition of a third term to the director-subject binary. Nasia, the narrator, hitting the limits 
of her comprehension of the tragedy around her, begins to invent a story of heroism for her 
boyfriend George, a story not unlike one that he might in his dreams have crafted for himself. 
Nasia is the intercessor in George’s story, and Green her accomplice, though the director’s 
images at times belie and run counter to Nasia’s narration. The free indirect, therefore, is doubly 
inscribed: Nasia engages in a free indirect récit about George, and Green crafts his story by 
incorporating Nasia’s “dialect”: Green speaks indirectly for Nasia who speaks indirectly for 
George. The free indirect discourse in this instance in not a falsification in two parallel directions 
but rather is triangular.  
 We see a similarly complex variation at work in Four Eyed Monsters, for the filmmakers 
and the subjects of the film are, in fact, the same. We have then a story that is ostensibly true but 
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peppered with bursts of fiction and instances of incompossibility. Four Eyed Monsters is a 
particularly interesting case in that in profoundly complicates Deleuze’s free indirect by its dual 
authorship, as Buice’s and Crumley’s collective enunciation is undercut by Buice’s resistance to 
speaking Crumley’s words. In short, Buice’s contribution to the film is one that subtly attempts 
to subvert the narrative that is dominated by her partner. In light of the film’s central metaphor 
for love (the “monster” of the title that is derived from two being unified into one), it might be 
tempting to consider Buice’s and Crumley’s free indirect relationship with one another a 
becoming, an exemplar of Deleuze’s powers of falsification.  This becoming, though, is not a 
“clean” one. Buice, clearly a willing accomplice in this collective enunciation, nevertheless 
defiantly pushes back, refusing to allow her backstory to be negated or brushed aside by 
Crumley’s colonizing authorship. By offering to us images of “uncertain utterance”—do they 
originate with Crumley or Buice or both?—Four Eyed Monsters presents a free indirect 
discourse that complicates Deleuze’s model while still arriving at two core characteristics of the 
crystalline regime: incompossibility and indiscernability.  
 Within Deleuze’s crystalline formation is a phenomenon that is of crucial importance to 
my purposes—the de-linking of sound from the visual. This plays itself out in film history as the 
audio being at first a “component” of the image and later gaining autonomy, becoming a “pure 
act” unto itself, a separate entity that may be put into play with the film’s visual. As a 
consequence, sound and vision may enter into a free indirect interplay amongst themselves. This 
marks a contrast with, say, Antonioni, whose use of the free indirect was key to both Pasolini’s 
and Deleuze’s theorization of the device. With Antonioni, the free indirect is largely a visual 
manifestation, for his mise-en-scène begins to mimic the neurotic state of mind of his characters, 
producing a landscape that is colored and imbued with his character’s subjectivity, what 
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Schwartz calls a “delirious aestheticism.”136 What I’ve sought to uncover in this study has been 
how a similar relationship between character and environment in Antonioni might be made 
evident between character and soundscape. With our first example, George Washington, it was 
the contradiction between what the voiceover narration tells us and what the visuals show us that 
alerts us to Nasia’s fabulation. Thus, her voice becomes a crucial component in this instance of 
the free indirect. The voiceover narration is also put to use in curious ways in Kissing on the 
Mouth, wherein “real” voices abound over the images of fictional characters, thereby 
contaminating the narrative with documentary audio. Moreover, the film makes manifest the 
powers of the false, for Ellen’s fictional story becomes a truth by film’s end, for her voice, her 
testimony, joins the chorus of real acousmatic voices that suffuse the film. In the logic of Kissing 
on the Mouth, one is either real or fiction, embodied or disembodied. Ellen’s existence within 
both the film’s discreet realms signals her achievement of the transient oscillation made possible 
through falsification. Once again, Deleuze, with his distinction between the visual-image and the 
sound-image, provides us with a taxonomy to account for this radical departure from convention.  
 The three primary concerns of this project (the question of realism, free indirect 
discourse, and the disjunction of sound from image) come to a most productive synthesis with 
the work of Gus Van Sant, a synthesis that also allows us to continue to interrogate the notion of 
authorship begun in our discussion of Four Eyed Monsters. Van Sant, despite such a 
heterogeneous career, deploys a systematic insistence on maintaining his characters’ 
psychological opacity throughout much of his work. However, there exist in Elephant 
momentary breaks from this auteurial tendency. We can begin to recognize that sound and 
image achieve a unique interplay in Elephant that grants us entrée into the mental spaces that had 
been previously off-limits. By granting the audio elements of the film a degree of autonomy from 
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a strict tethering with the visual, Van Sant opens his distanced modus operandi to an 
intersubjective realm by initiating a free indirect relationship between sound and image, one that 
will lead to the most “interior” film of his career, Paranoid Park. With this film, the type of 
character (unreadable, wayward boys) that has so attracted Van Sant’s attentive yet “distanced” 
camera becomes not just a curiosity traversing about his any-space-whatever mise-en-scène; 
instead, Van Sant overcomes the barrier that kept his protagonists at arms’ length in earlier films 
and begins to explore the “mystery of the interiority” that Taubin proclaimed.  
 Thus, we have within one narrowly defined place and time a realist cinema that adheres 
to the neorealist prototype of casting non-actors, shooting on locations as opposed to sets, 
elliptical narrative structure, etc. However, by exploring these films, we’ve arrived at the 
opposite pole of the pervasive conception of realism that began the study. That is to say, rather 
than an “objective” record of a phenomenon (such as poverty, labor, the immediate aftermath of 
war, etc.), we’ve instead found ourselves lodged between that world and the realm of the 
subjective. What’s more, this subjectivity is often multifaceted: with George Washington, we 
have filmmaker, narrator, and a third enigmatic character; with Kissing on the Mouth, it’s a 
filmmaker playing a filmmaker, one who prods his friends and potential lovers to allow him 
entry to their subjective space; in Four Eyed Monsters, a pair of lovers-turned-filmmakers 
attempt to tell a fictionalized version of their romance, but their voices clash as they attempt to 
arrive at an objective rendering of their actual past; finally, with Paranoid Park, we have a film 
that, despite all the trappings of its realist inheritance, is so firmly rooted in its subject’s 
interiority that we begin to fully experience the coexistent temporalities that Deleuze describes: 
the visuals move at one speed, sound at another, and all the while, the past seeps into the present, 
and the present bleeds into the past. What’s more, Van Sant can only arrive at his young hero’s 
103 
 
interior by mapping himself onto the endeavor. Can we not once again evoke Deleuze’s words 
on Shirley Clarke (with appropriate modifications, of course): the film Van Sant wanted to make 
about himself became the film he made about Alex. 
So are these above variations of, as Deleuze describes the incipient modern cinema, “new 
signs invading the screen”? Or, better yet, might we adopt here Bazin’s words to describe the 
emergence of neorealism? Bazin likens the pre-war cinema to a river, one that had attained 
“equilibrium.” Yet this equilibrium, this stasis, can be disrupted: 
But if any geological movement occurs which raises the erosion level and modifies the 
height of the source, the water sets to work again, seeps into the surrounding land, goes 
deeper, burrowing and digging. Sometimes when it is a chalk bed, a new pattern is dug 
across the plain, almost invisible but found to be complex and winding, if one follows the 
flow of the water.137 
 
In other words, the cinema becomes stale or staid, then some event or change occurs, one that 
sets a new course for the medium. This, of course, is why Bazin is present on page one of The 
Time-Image, for Deleuze has, in a rare historicist moment, isolated the war and neorealism as 
markers of the fundamental shift.  
Might we conclude, then, that the shifting river bed here reflects not only the larger 
symptoms of postmodernism but a particular moment, one in which not only has the image 
proliferated (via film, television, advertising, etc.) but that consumers now increasingly 
contribute to their production? This seems most certainly a factor with the Mumblecore films 
(particularly Four Eyed Monsters), wherein nearly every character is a producer of images of one 
sort or another, images that they then exchange, recombine, manipulate, and/or traffic in. With 
the possible exception of George Washington—which aside from a few references to George H. 
W. Bush contains little to place the film within any specific time period—the films under 
consideration in this project all feature a failure of images or symbolic interaction on a number of 
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fronts. With Mumblecore, the spoken word is the source of a particularly postmodern brand of 
ennui. But note the other intermediary forms that also fail: the characters of Four Eyed Monsters 
cannot overcome their suspicion of speech through animation, painting, photography, or 
drawing. Chris, the photographer in Kissing on the Mouth, attempts to posses his female models 
through the image, momentarily locking them into place when they prove far less bendable to his 
will when the camera is no longer in his hands. Likewise, the still image experiences its most 
damning failure in Elephant, where Elias counters a rifle with his camera and is promptly killed. 
Finally, in Paranoid Park, Alex’s voiceover is attributed to his rather “old-fashioned” letter, one 
that allows him to confront the trauma of the guard’s gruesome death, but only long enough for 
him to in turn burn the pages. Amid a glut of images, of methods of symbolic exchange, all seem 
to fail.  
There is, though, one exception: sound. An example: Kissing on the Mouth’s Patrick 
cannot “have” Ellen in any tangible sense, though he achieves a modest success—if we may call 
it that—in his recording of her, which disembodies her but nonetheless makes her present at his 
whim. While Patrick’s fetishization of the voice is certainly no victory that we can applaud, it 
highlights what is most crucial about sound—that it is at once “there” and yet always to an extent 
absent, invisible. In Chapter 1, we discussed realism as being about far more than objectivity. Its 
stakes, I have argued, were to pull out from the world that which subtends our lived experience, 
to make manifest that which is obscured or hidden away by the “spiritual dust and grime” of our 
day-to-day habitus.138 But what if what continues to elude us is that which can never be 
visualized, which would necessarily subsume the voices that remain acousmatic, the sounds we 
hear within the confines of the movie theatre that envelop us but might never be “sourced” on the 
screen? How ironic then that upon its introduction, synchronous sound was thought to be the 
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death of the seventh art, for it is sound that pushes us past the limits of vision and points us 
towards the sublime, that which is always there yet always absent. In a passage that suggests the 
“boundlessness” of the Kantian sublime, Chion describes the lack of any limit or barrier to sound 
that corresponds to the rectangular frame of the image. He writes: “For sound there is neither 
frame nor preexisting container. We can pile up as many sounds on the soundtrack as we wish 
without reaching a limit.”139 Sound, then, occupies a peculiar place within the cinema, for it may 
contribute a certain verisimilitude to, or, in contrast, disturb the reality effect of the visual. 
Moreover, it may “fill in” the image, make it “whole,” but only by subtending the visible image 
with yet more of that which cannot be seen. We can likewise find an echo of such a sentiment in 
Buñuel in a passage quoted at length earlier, wherein he contrasts realism with that continually 
alluded-to classification of cinema that speaks to a “beyond”—“poetry.” This more proper 
register of cinema is, according to Bunuel, comprised of “all that completes and enlarges tangible 
reality.” Is this not what our examples here have accomplished? More generally and more 
pertinently, is this not what sound does—“completes” reality while making it something 
altogether more “open” than it was?  
The primary aim of this study has been to examine a body of contemporary films within a 
singular cultural context and cast them as realist works. The most likely objection might be that 
they are obviously realist in that they adhere to the neorealist model of non-professional actors, 
location shooting, elliptical narratives, and the use of the long take. While these production 
techniques and stylistic conventions are certainly at play, it is how these films deviate from the 
“cut-and-dry” neorealist model that most intrigues me, for, as I have shown, these “mutations” 
are quite in line with Bazin’s realism (or the realism he foresaw). What Bazin and others were 
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seeking in the filmic image was always something more mysterious and ethereal than mere 
objectivity. Thus, I’ve sought contemporary examples for two reasons: one, to claim these films 
as continuations of an ever-evolving realist impulse and not simply postmodern stylistic mimicry 
(though they are certainly postmodern films); and two, to sufficiently broaden the conception of 
realism to encompass films that might even be rejected on the grounds of these deviations—the 
concern with character subjectivity, auteurial “expressionism”, and/or radical departures from an 
“objective” camera style. Crucial to this conception of realism is that which is not on the 
screen—that which, due to the cinema’s asymptotic relationship to the real, cannot be rendered 
via representation and thus remains invisible. In Dudley Andrew’s recent reconsideration of 
Bazin, he notes precisely this point by elucidating what it was that Bazin was seeking: “For years 
it has been said that Bazin’s naïve realism took the visible to be the real, the epiphanic image 
reached after solving or dissolving the maze of narrative, whereas it was ever the soul of the 
mummy that he sought through what appears on the screen.”140 For Bazin, it was never what was 
on the screen that truly mattered, but what was just outside the camera’s reach, that which resides 
as concealed in the world that is likewise beyond the image. 
So if the term realism proves indeed to be so flexible, then is it still useful? Daniel 
Morgan astutely notes that, once we’ve overcome the “thin and impoverished picture” of Bazin 
that has gained such traction, the issue becomes not that a Bazinian realism accounts for but a 
small fraction of the films produced, but that the number is, in fact, overwhelmingly large.141 
“The problem,” writes Morgan, “is not that [Bazin’s framework] is too restrictive, that it is 
founded on and so only recognizes a limited set of similar styles. Instead, realism now seems 
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applicable to any and every film.”142 I agree here with Morgan’s premise, but not his conclusion, 
for the necessary component of Bazinian realism is, as I’ve contended, the co-presence of the 
irrational with the seemingly rational whole, a condition what is not often found in commercial 
cinema. It is for this reason that Deleuze is such a crucial interlocutor for Bazin, for his cinematic 
theory embraces in explicit (and, at times, confounding) terms this paradoxical characteristic.  
 Perhaps we should find a more suitable term for this type of cinema that intrigued not 
only Bazin but also Buñuel, Epstein, Deleuze, Kracauer, Benjamin, and any number of other 
prominent thinkers from the previous century. Dudley Andrew has argued that Bazin’s attention 
shifted late in his life from his early preoccupation with realism to a greater concern with 
adaptation—in both the literary and the evolutionary sense.143 In light of this shift, Andrew, too, 
alters his terminology, substituting for what I’ve here called Bazinian realism with a simpler 
term—cinema. Though we frequently use the terms film and cinema interchangeably, Andrew is 
quick to caution that, though all that falls within the category of “cinema” is most certainly a 
“film,” not all that is film is “cinema.” Cinema, in Andrew’s argument, “aim[s] to discover, to 
encounter, to confront, and to reveal.”144 But is this not what Deleuze is describing in The Time-
Image with the interval, the point in between the actual and the virtual which engenders new 
thought? Despite Deleuze’s insistence that the cinema is non-representational, he nevertheless 
acknowledges the existence of an external, tangible world, one to which we can only “link up” 
with, amid the ever increasing flux of images, via the very type of thought that the cinema can 
initiate. The cinema, describes Deleuze, 
affects the visible with a fundamental disturbance, and the world with a suspension, 
which contradicts all natural perception. What it produces in this way is the genesis of an 
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“unknown body” which we have in the back of our heads, like the unthought in thought, 
the birth of the visible which is still hidden from view.145 
 
 Deleuze elaborates on this “fundamental disturbance” further, tying it precisely to the type of 
disjunction of sound and image that we’ve considered in this study. “There will . . . be a relation 
between [image and sound],” claims Deleuze, “a junction or contact.” 
[…] And the irrational cut between the two, which forms the non-totalizable relation, the 
broken ring of their junction, the asymmetrical faces of their contact. This is a perpetual 
relinkage. Speech reaches its own limit which separates it from the visual; but the visual 
reaches its own limit which separates it from sound. So each one reaching its own limit 
which separates it from the other thus discovers the common limit which connects them 
to each other in the incommensurable relation of an irrational cut, the right side and its 
obverse, the outside and the inside.146  
 
 Within the body of American films in the project, we see just such a relation: a limit 
situation, an irrational contact between an autonomous sound- and visual-image, one that 
connects the outside (the “objective” world) and the inside (subjectivity). This junction produces 
what Deleuze calls a “perpetual exchange” between the two, a flow of one into the other and 
back, a space between real and virtual, subject and object. Bazin, in the epigraph that opens 
Chapter 1, posits that realism “can take a thousand different routes.”147 This study, I hope, has 
explored and plotted one such route.   
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